In late August, Russia launched a massive air attack against Kyiv, killing at least 18 people, including 4 children, in Ukraine’s capital city. European leaders quickly condemned the attacks and called for Russian President Vladimir Putin to accept a ceasefire and negotiate directly with Ukraine. British Prime Minister Keir Starmer charged that “Putin is killing children and civilians, and sabotaging hopes of peace. This bloodshed must end.” Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelenskyy agreed. “Russia chooses ballistics instead of the negotiating table,” he said on X, calling for further sanctions on Russia. “It chooses to continue killing instead of ending the war.”
Ongoing attempts to end the conflict that Moscow launched in February 2022 have failed thus far. In a recent high-level meeting in Alaska, Trump and Putin met to discuss the Ukraine war – a meeting that notably excluded the Ukrainian president. Zelenskyy then traveled to Washington with European leaders to meet with Trump, asking the U.S. president not to pursue any deal that would cede Ukrainian territory.
Zelenskyy and his European allies have repeatedly said that Ukraine must be included in any peace talks. But the Russian government has made its position clear: Russia refuses to include Ukraine in ongoing negotiations.
Reaching a permanent peace is likely to be difficult for a number of reasons. But Putin’s refusal to bargain directly with Zelenskyy is particularly problematic. Putin is seeking a settlement that involves Russia formally annexing Ukrainian territory, without Ukraine having a voice in negotiations. In the past, great powers might have taken this approach to impose territorial settlements. But any peace deal for Ukraine reached under these conditions will likely be both ineffective and illegitimate, and simply lay the groundwork for future conflict.
Russia refuses to recognize Ukraine as a legitimate negotiating partner
At the Aug. 15 Alaska summit with Trump, Putin demanded Kyiv’s withdrawal from Donetsk and Luhansk – Ukrainian territories collectively known as the Donbas region, where Russia has been supporting separatists for more than a decade – as a condition for ending the war. Russia also wants Ukraine to acknowledge that Crimea, annexed by Russia in 2014, is part of Russia. Putin told Trump that he was willing to accept a freeze among the rest of the front line. Sources also reported that Putin’s peace would include Ukraine giving up its ambition to join NATO, along with a pledge from the U.S.-led military alliance that it will not expand further eastwards, restrictions on the size of the Ukrainian army, and an agreement that no Western troops will be deployed on the ground in Ukraine as part of a peacekeeping force.
Ukraine has rejected any concession of its territory as unacceptable. Zelenskyy also sees security guarantees, including the presence of Western troops, as an integral part of any settlement. But Ukraine had no presence at the Alaska meetings, nor have there been any direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, despite Zelenskyy’s repeated offer to meet “unconditionally and directly discuss territorial questions.”
Why reject direct negotiations?
Putin seems to be refusing to negotiate directly with Zelenskyy for a few reasons. First, Moscow no doubt believes that Zelenskyy is unlikely to cede territory, particularly those areas that Ukraine still controls. According to U.S. estimates, Russian forces control about 88% of the Donbas and 73% of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson – two territories that connect the Donbas to Crimea. Trump, in contrast, seems willing to press Ukraine to accept a territorial exchange for peace, perhaps even withdrawing U.S. military support in order to coerce Zelenskyy to accept a settlement.
Second, Putin’s refusal to negotiate with Zelenskyy stems from a long-standing aversion to recognizing Ukraine’s elected government as legitimate. As Russian foreign minister Sergey Lavrov noted in an Aug. 22 interview, “How can we meet with a person who is pretending to be a leader?” Putin is now tying his claims about this lack of legitimacy to Zelenskyy’s extended term in office. Ukraine, under martial law since the Russian invasion in 2022, suspended the scheduled 2024 elections, so Zelenskyy has now been in office longer than the usual 5-year term. But Putin has also claimed that Zelenskyy was never fairly elected and that, in fact, the whole nation of Ukraine is a false construct.
For now, Moscow seems to hope to arrange a peace via Washington, leaving Kyiv out of the process. This is not a normal state of affairs, at least, not in this century.
The shifting norms of great power territorial management
In the not-too-distant past, great powers would bargain amongst themselves to reach territorial settlements, leaving “lesser” powers out of the process. During the 19th century Concert of Europe, for example, the great powers managed their competition through the vigorous horse-trading of territory. Colonial powers often saw little need to bargain with indigenous political communities when divvying up power. After both World War I and World War II, international organizations and wartime allies partitioned territory across the globe, creating new countries altogether.
But three normative shifts have undermined the legitimacy of imposed territorial bargains. First, by the mid-19th century, the rise of nationalism rendered territory largely indivisible, unable to be exchanged, purchased, or conquered. Nations began to identify their territories as “homelands.” Stories of nations conquering, cultivating, and fighting over sacred ground made the idea that sovereign countries could blithely trade or purchase territory unfathomable.
Second, there was an overall decrease in legitimacy of aggression and the outright conquest of territory. Even when governments successfully occupied territory – Israel in the West Bank after 1967, or Iraq in Kuwait in 1990 – international law and norms mandated that any settlement be negotiated among the parties. This helped smaller countries assert that they had equal legal rights as sovereign entities, and thus an equal say over the status of their territories. This became particularly significant during decolonization, as newly independent powers proclaimed a right to self-determination and non-interference from the great powers.
In practice, of course, great powers continued to interfere in smaller countries. But even here, this interference often involved appeals to international norms, and the use of international institutions to justify “exceptional” violations. But as these norms have weakened, we’ve seen an increase in great powers’ claims to manage other countries’ territorial holdings – think not only of Trump’s belief that he can bargain over Ukrainian territory, but also his suggestions that other countries should manage Gaza.
No Ukraine, no peace
Despite Putin and Trump’s efforts, any peace settlement reached without Ukraine at the bargaining table will be both illegitimate and ineffective. It will be illegitimate, because it is unlikely that Ukraine, its European supporters, or any international institution will recognize the legality of Russia’s claims. Because Putin is demanding territory outside of what is formally Russia, it is unclear how Moscow plans to replace the recognition of legal rights with military might.
A peace settlement formed without Ukraine is also likely to be ineffective. Researchers point to a number of specific conditions necessary for a territorial peace to hold. These include measures to prevent future aggression by either one of the parties, including the development of territorial buffer zones, ongoing peacekeeping efforts, and the promise of external support in the face of violations. It also means creating political processes acceptable to ethnically heterogenous territories, such as in the Donbas region, where Ukrainians comprise over 55% of the population. And even with these conditions in place, a lasting peace will be difficult to come by.
All of these conditions require that the Ukrainian leadership be on board. As a sovereign country, Ukraine must be willing to accept a peacekeeping force and concede to a demilitarized “buffer” zone. Without Ukraine’s support, there is no chance for the stabilization of ethnic conflict in the Donbas. As long as Ukraine is missing a seat at the bargaining table, there is little chance for an end to this conflict.
