In 2025, elections in Central and Eastern Europe saw far-right parties surging in the polls, warnings about renewed Russian meddling – and a grinding war next door in Ukraine. The outcome of these races mattered to both local voters and their European neighbors. What do the recent elections in these five countries – Romania, Moldova, Poland, Czechia (the Czech Republic), and Belarus – tell us about where the region is headed?
Summary of elections in five Eastern and Central European countries
| Date | Country and type of election |
| January 2025 | 🇧🇾 Belarus – presidential election (* not a competitive election: Alyaksandr Lukashenka has been president since 1994) |
| May 2025 | 🇷🇴 Romania – presidential election do-over (Nicușor Dan elected) |
| May 2025 | 🇵🇱 Poland – presidential election (Karol Nawrocki elected) |
| October 2025 | 🇨🇿 Czechia – parliamentary elections (ANO/Babiš leads) |
| October 2025 | 🇲🇩 Moldova – parliamentary elections (PAS wins majority) |
Romania and Moldova: Kremlin-friendly forces face defeat
Social media manipulations were at the heart of the turmoil marking Romania’s presidential election. The election began in November 2024, but the outcome was not fully resolved until May 2025. In the first round, dark horse pro-Russian candidate Călin Georgescu came out on top, thanks to support fueled largely by a viral – and illegal – TikTok campaign. But Georgescu’s unexpected win triggered a constitutional crisis: Election officials annulled the results, alleging Russian interference, and Georgescu was later charged with plotting a coup.
Romania then held a May 2025 “do-over” election. The former mayor of Bucharest, Nicușor Dan, a centrist mathematician, beat far-right nationalist populist George Simion by 7 points – a wide margin. But that doesn’t mean politics is back to normal in Romania. Anti-establishment forces remain strong, and many disillusioned Romanians believe that cancelling the first round election was unfair – an opinion I heard fairly often while traveling in Romania this summer.
The chaotic political events in Romania put policymakers in its eastern neighbor, Moldova, on high alert. Moldova’s pro-European president Maia Sandu had won re-election in 2024, but the 2025 parliamentary elections represented another opportunity for Kremlin-aligned forces, both domestic and external, to undermine Moldova’s path toward full integration into the European Union.
In the run-up to this year’s parliamentary elections, Russian-funded disinformation campaigns spread across social media, seeking to disrupt the chances of the pro-E.U. ruling party, the Party of Action and Solidarity (PAS), to retain its parliamentary majority. Ultimately, PAS scored a decisive victory. But research I conducted with Grigo Pop-Eleches revealed some voters found the social media manipulations and other Russian tactics persuasive.
The figure below summarizes the E.U. and NATO membership status of the five countries highlighted in this article. Currently, Moldova is a member of neither organization. But with pro-European forces controlling both the presidency and parliament, Moldova can push its E.U. ambitions forward with fewer political roadblocks. E.U. membership is far from a done deal, however. A significant share of Moldovans remain skeptical of a Western geopolitical orientation. This raises concerns that E.U. integration could become the project of a single political party rather than a society-wide commitment. And Moldova’s “frozen conflict” with the separatist region of Transnistria is another important hurdle to be cleared.
Who is part of the E.U. and NATO?
Poland and Czechia: right-wing populists carry the day
While staunchly pro-European forces won in Romania and Moldova, Poland’s 2025 presidential election played out differently. In the June 1 runoff race, right-wing historian Karol Nawrocki secured 51.9% of the vote, beating his rival, liberal Warsaw mayor Rafal Trzakowski, by a razor-thin margin. This result was somewhat of an upset, with Trzakowski leading in the polls before the first round of voting.
Nawrocki is affiliated with the Party of Justice and Solidarity (known by its Polish acronym, PiS). This is the party that significantly undermined Poland’s democracy from 2015 to 2023, before being voted out by a united opposition and record turnout of Polish voters. Observers labeled Nawrocki’s presidential win this summer as an “upheaval,” predicting conflict with Prime Minister Donald Tusk, who returned to office in 2023 promising to reverse the PiS democratic rollback and rebuild relations with the E.U.
Right-wing populists also claimed a decisive victory in the Czech parliamentary elections, which took place in early October. The ANO party (an acronym for “Action for Alienated Citizens,” which also translates to “yes” in Czech) secured 35% of the vote, with the highest turnout since 1998. ANO signed a coalition agreement with two other far-right parties. Andrej Babiš, the party leader and a billionaire many call the “Czech Trump,” was sworn in as prime minister on Dec. 9, 2025. Babiš previously served as prime minister from 2017 to 2021. His recent criticism of media outlets sparked concerns about “tougher times ahead” for Czech journalists.
Like Poland’s PiS, ANO has no plans to radically break ties with the E.U. But the new Czech government is expected to oppose some E.U. policies related to migration and climate change. Aid for Ukraine could also take a hit, with Babiš already promising to cancel state funding for weapons. This policy shift reflects broader “compassion fatigue” in Central Europe, where citizens generously welcomed Ukrainians refugees at the beginning of the full-scale war but increasingly raise concerns about resource constraints. For his part, Poland’s new president has been described as “ambivalent” about Ukraine.
Belarus: election or coronation?
The final election to mention is what some critics are calling an “auto-coronation.” At the beginning of 2025, Belarusian dictator Alyaksandr Lukashenka began his seventh consecutive term as president. Despite widespread accusations of election fraud, he claimed to have won 87% of the vote.
Elected in 1994 in a contest outside observers recognized as free and fair, Lukashenka has consolidated power through widespread repression. In 2020 and 2021, large numbers of Belarusians took to the streets to protest against election fraud, only to face a brutal crackdown by Lukashenka’s regime. Since then, the president many call “Europe’s last dictator” has clamped down even harder on domestic dissent.
Lukashenka has subordinated himself to Russian President Vladimir Putin, and allowed Russian troops to use Belarus as a staging ground for the 2022 invasion of Ukraine – a decision he claims he does “not regret.” In a recent article, I argue that the Russia-Belarus relationship is a classic example of “authoritarian backscratching,” explaining how autocrats advance their interests by enacting mutually beneficial policies. Putin’s survival may not depend on Lukashenka, one of his few allies, but Lukashenka’s survival likely depends on Putin’s.
What are the big takeaways from these 2025 elections?
There were no obvious winners in 2025. Pro-European parties and candidates beat out their euroskeptic, Russia-friendly competitors in Moldova and Romania. But right-wing candidates triumphed in Czechia and Poland, criticizing E.U. policies yet avoiding calls for a dramatic rupture with Brussels. And this year’s elections brought little change to Belarus, as the same autocratic leader marks more than 30 years in power.
Overall, the results signal challenges ahead for the E.U. leadership, which will have to contend with a growing number of potential “spoilers,” or countries that – like Hungary – buck the status quo to oppose policies championed by Brussels. Ukrainians, whether on the front lines of the war or seeking refuge elsewhere in Europe, may also suffer if some European electorates push for aid cuts.
At the same time, E.U. officials avoided even greater challenges that might have resulted from pro-Russian parties or candidates gaining office in Romania or Moldova. To the extent that a loss for Russia is a win for Ukraine, those two results were good news. And right now, Ukraine needs all the good news it can get.
Isabelle DeSisto is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow.
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