The prospect of an end to the war in Ukraine has dominated headlines since Donald Trump’s inauguration on Jan. 21, 2025. Few observers genuinely believed that Trump would fulfill his promise to put a stop to the war in 24 hours. But many in Europe and in the United States expected an intensification of talks between the incoming Trump team and the leadership in Kyiv and Moscow.
Less anticipated were Trump’s public denunciation of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy as a “dictator” and his decision to sideline the Ukrainian president in preliminary talks with Russian officials. Americans and Europeans alike were shocked when Zelenskyy’s White House visit on Feb. 28 – ostensibly to sign a minerals deal – devolved into a tense confrontation that many observers described as an “ambush” by Trump and Vice President JD Vance.
Ukrainians’ views on the war also matter
But reports on these developments too often neglect the perspective of ordinary Ukrainians, who have pushed back against Russian aggression in their country for over ten years. Russia’s full-scale invasion began on Feb. 24, 2022 – but the war in eastern Ukraine has been ongoing since 2014. What do Ukrainians think about peace talks? And, ultimately, how much sway will their views have on shaping the final outcome of any future negotiations?
Most Ukrainians support their president and reject Russia’s claims to their territory. Ignoring Ukrainians’ views and wishes would seem both morally objectionable and strategically unsound. Trump and Russian President Vladimir Putin may well come to some kind of agreement with little or no Ukrainian input. However, excluding Ukrainians from the peace process would almost certainly guarantee its failure in the long term, stripping any agreement of legitimacy and fueling Russia’s revanchist ambitions.
Insights from public opinion polling in Ukraine
Survey research conducted by political scientists in July 2022 suggested that, five months after Russia’s full-scale invasion, Ukrainians emphatically opposed political and territorial concessions, regardless of the high costs of fighting. At that time, 80% were “fully confident” their country would win the war and liberate Russian-occupied territories. However, another study uncovered differences in the way Ukrainians view the tradeoff between minimizing casualties and recovering territory. Ukrainians who had suffered violence expressed greater support for a ceasefire.
Over two years later, a Gallup poll released on the 1,000th day of the full-scale war revealed that many Ukrainians had grown weary of the fighting and were increasingly open to making territorial concessions to Russia. In this 2024 poll, 52% said that Ukraine should negotiate an end to the war as soon as possible, while 38% said Ukraine should keep fighting until it wins the war. The same poll showed that the share of Ukrainians who interpreted “victory” as regaining all territory lost since 2014 had declined from 93% in 2022, to 81% in 2024.
But it is important to recognize that for Ukrainians, negotiating a peace agreement is not the same as unconditionally laying down arms. Negotiations inevitably involve compromises. For Ukrainians, an acceptable deal must protect Ukraine’s core interests and provide security guarantees that prevent Russia from launching another attack. For example, Ukrainians have united around their pursuit of European integration, with 89% expressing support in May 2022 for joining the European Union. There is also a consensus around a desire for NATO membership – an outcome that seems less likely in the near future.
“Nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine”
Scholars have argued that negotiations between Ukraine and Russia would be unlikely to succeed, given the challenge of providing “credible commitments” to abide by whatever agreement is reached. An added hurdle is that both sides see the lands occupied by Russia as “indivisible” (see, for example, perspectives by Stacie Goddard and Rob Person). Absent robust security guarantees for Ukraine, it is difficult to imagine a scenario in which Russia could credibly commit to honoring a peace agreement.
If Ukraine-Russia talks are unlikely to generate lasting peace, then talks that explicitly exclude Ukraine are all but guaranteed to fail. Under the Trump administration, the “nothing about Ukraine without Ukraine” principle, a cornerstone of the Biden administration’s approach toward talks with Russia, has been eroded. Forcing Ukraine to accept a deal it had no part in designing recalls the 1945 Yalta conference. That’s where Josef Stalin, Franklin Roosevelt, and Winston Churchill carved up Europe after World War II, setting the stage for decades-long Cold War divisions. Negotiations in 2025 without Ukraine at the table play into Putin’s false narrative that Ukraine is not a sovereign nation with a democratically elected government.
Audience costs during wartime negotiations
Even if Trump and Putin were able to compel Zelenskyy to agree to a deal drafted without his input, winning over the Ukrainian public would still be a major challenge. Unlike Russia, where the Kremlin has near-total control over the media landscape, Ukrainians have rallied around democracy. The country maintains an independent media – despite some restrictions on journalists during wartime. In this democratic climate, Ukraine’s leaders must take citizens’ preferences into account when making foreign policy decisions. After all, Ukraine has a robust history of mobilizing against unpopular policies. During the 2013-2014 Euromaidan Revolution, for example, Ukrainians took to the streets to protest President Viktor Yanukovych’s decision not to sign an Association Agreement with the E.U.
Public opinion in Ukraine matters because Zelenskyy faces audience costs – an international relations concept that refers to the prospect of domestic backlash if a leader reneges on a public commitment. Zelenskyy has repeatedly promised to fight for the return of all territories Russia occupied since 2014 – including Crimea – and steer Ukraine toward E.U. and NATO membership. If he backtracks on his commitments, the Ukrainian public could vote Zelenskyy out in the next election. It’s also worth noting that as of May 2024, 65% of Ukrainians said that the result of any negotiation should be put to a referendum.
Audience costs matter more for democracies, because citizens can vote out leaders whose actions they oppose. But research suggests that autocratic elites – including Vladimir Putin – also face audience costs.
Elections are currently suspended in Ukraine under the constitution’s guidelines on martial law, a decision that most Ukrainians continue to support. But eventually normal electoral politics will return to Ukraine. Although Zelenskyy remains popular – in contrast to Donald Trump’s bizarre claim about a low 4% approval rate – he will certainly face competition at the ballot box. One potential challenger is General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, former commander-in-chief of the Ukrainian armed forces, who currently has an approval rating even higher than Zelenskyy’s.
Ukrainians are fighting hard for their freedom
Discounting the perspective of Ukrainian citizens would be foolish not just as a negotiation strategy but also as a moral position. Ukrainians have fought bravely to preserve their freedom, bearing significant costs. We must not forget the Ukrainians who have suffered and continue to suffer under Russian occupation, where violence, deportations, and attempts to “re-educate” Ukrainian children are commonplace.
For the Trump administration, Ukrainian land may be lines on a map, but for Ukrainians the stakes are much higher. They have been fighting for Ukraine’s sovereignty and culture, and for the lives of their countrymen. Any negotiation that denies Ukrainians agency over their own future will lack the legitimacy to succeed.
Isabelle DeSisto is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow.
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