China and Russia declared their friendship has “no limits,” codified in a Feb. 4 joint statement. But China abstained on two U.N. votes to condemn Russia’s Feb. 24 invasion of Ukraine, stopping short of giving Russia its full support.
To some analysts, the statement from Presidents Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin was a “radical departure from the past” — a sign that the two leaders had “declared a united front against the United States and its allies.” Certainly the China-Russia relationship appears closer than at any point since the early Cold War. China now officially “opposes further enlargement of NATO,” for instance.
But as much as the 5,000-word statement reveals about the partnership’s strength, it obscures equally important limitations — and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine further complicates the relationship.
China is wary of Russian moves and motives
In the Feb. 4 statement, Beijing sympathized with Russia’s Ukraine policy and supported Moscow’s proposals for security guarantees in Europe. Before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, Beijing maintained friendly relations with Kyiv and probably is wary of fallout over its close relationship with Russia — and its perceived role as the Kremlin’s silent accomplice.
In early March, China’s top diplomat told his Ukrainian counterpart that Beijing “deplores the outbreak of conflict between Ukraine and Russia and is extremely concerned about civilian causalities.” Subsequently, Beijing suggested it might mediate between Russia and Ukraine.
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Russia’s facilitation of separatist movements in post-Soviet states contradicts one of the fundamental tenets of Chinese foreign policy — the inviolability of national sovereignty. China’s approach to Taiwan rests on this very basis. Beijing claims Taiwan as part of China, and Beijing’s “one-China principle” is a cornerstone of Chinese foreign policy.
Beijing opposes efforts by the international community to afford Taiwan any recognition of statehood and reserves the right to use military force to counter any official declaration of independence by Taiwan. After formally recognizing the independence of Donetsk and Luhansk in eastern Ukraine, Russia is now intent on carving further into Ukraine’s territory. This approach probably raises concerns in Beijing that Taiwan (aided by the United States) could be stripped from China. Russia’s actions in Ukraine also have served to enhance international support for preserving Taiwan’s autonomy.
Russia’s territorial revisionism has consistently caused unease in Beijing. In 2014, China claimed to be neutral about Russia’s annexation of Crimea — and abstained on U.N. resolutions condemning Russia and supporting Ukraine’s territorial integrity.
In 2008, Beijing didn’t follow Moscow’s lead, or recognize the breakaway Georgian provinces of South Ossetia and Abkhazia. China and other members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization, a Eurasian regional security group founded in 2001, declined to endorse Russian actions in Georgia unequivocally. Instead, the members committed to the “unity and territorial integrity of states.”
What’s off limits in the relationship?
Contrary to the Feb. 4 declaration that “there are no ‘forbidden’ areas of cooperation” in the Sino-Russian partnership, there is at least one proscribed issue: any discussion of its limitations. Both countries restrict what the media and individuals can say, and it is increasingly difficult to find challenges in the bilateral relationship discussed publicly. However, for those who have followed the expert discussion over the past several decades and met with analysts from both countries, differences have long been evident.
Xi and Putin have declared a united front against the United States
As the Ukraine war illustrates, China and Russia usually agree on broad principles (e.g., opposition to U.S. alliances), but they often diverge on specifics or policy remedies. In principle, Russia supports China’s rising economic and military power. In practice, the disparity in Chinese and Russian power creates unease about a U.S.-China bipolar world sidelining Moscow.
Russia’s insecurity over the growth of China’s power is reflected in concerns articulated in scholarly discussion in Russia over Xi’s aim to create a “community of common destiny” to ensure China’s stewardship. Such a community would require a leader — which would not be Russia.
Moscow is also keeping a close eye on China’s growing power and presence in areas traditionally regarded as Russia’s sphere of influence. In Central Asia, China’s Belt and Road Initiative development projects encourage dependence on Chinese investment and trade, competing with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. In the Arctic, Russia has served as the wary gatekeeper for China’s growing ambitions as a “near-Arctic state.”
In Asia, Russia’s efforts to maintain influence come at China’s expense. India and Vietnam, Russia’s long-standing regional partners, are historical Chinese adversaries. Russia continues to sell cutting-edge weapons to India and Vietnam — weapons that either country could use against China in a conflict. Russia has done little to support China’s positions on the South China Sea and instead cooperated with Vietnam to develop offshore energy resources.
What will China do now?
The invasion of Ukraine has the potential to exacerbate these differences, despite any statements of Sino-Russian friendship. Russia is counting on China to offset the pain of Western economic sanctions. For now, China appears to be going along with Western sanctions, while protesting their legality. Chinese commercial banks began limiting financing to Russian customers, and the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank suspended lending to Russia and Moscow ally Belarus. Russia also claimed China was refusing to supply commercial aircraft parts.
However, China’s UnionPay credit card provides some respite for Russian consumers cut off from Western credit and banking systems. And China relies on Russia for a significant share of its oil, gas and coal imports. U.S. officials say Russia has asked China for military equipment, but it is unclear how Beijing will respond.
If Beijing’s moves now leave Moscow disappointed, this may well aggravate other irritants in the partnership.
Putin’s invasion of Ukraine has placed Xi in a number of uncomfortable, if not untenable, positions — with Russia, with the United States and Europe, and with the supposedly sacrosanct principles of Chinese foreign policy. These ripples are happening as the Chinese president, who is personally invested in the partnership with Putin, aspires to a third, if not an unlimited, term in office. With Xi — and China — looking ahead to the fall 2022 20th Party Congress, a major shift in China’s Russia policy seems unlikely. Over the weeks and months ahead, however, China’s growing recognition of the costs of partnership with Moscow may weaken its appeal.
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Elizabeth Wishnick is a senior research scientist at CNA, a nonprofit research institute in Arlington, Va., and the author of the China’s Resource Risks blog. She is on leave from Montclair State University and is a senior research scholar at the Weatherhead East Asian Institute at Columbia University.
Andrew Taffer is a research scientist at CNA and an associate with the International Security Program at the Belfer Center at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government.
Their views are their own and do not represent the policy or position of CNA or any of its sponsors.
