From President Biden to the U.S. media, almost everyone frames the war in Ukraine as a battle between democracy and autocracy. Are democracies equipped to prevail, some wonder? With slow decision-making, volunteer armies and polarized public opinion, democracies might seem at a disadvantage.
Questions about the security capabilities of democracies resonate beyond the crisis in Ukraine. Whether democracies can successfully fight speaks to the ability of South Korea to fend off North Korea, of Israel to survive in its hostile environment and of the United States to compete with China in the 2020s and beyond. Our research suggests democracies are well-equipped to win in fights against autocracies.
Ukraine is fighting — and winning
The unfolding war in Ukraine suggests autocracies enjoy few advantages on the battlefield. Ukraine is faring far better against Russia than many had projected. In four weeks, Russia has reportedly experienced 7,000 to 15,000 combat fatalities. The United States suffered around 7,000 deaths across two decades of conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan. Russia has also reportedly lost more than 1,500 military vehicles to Ukrainians armed with U.S. and British antitank weapons.
Ukraine updated its defense institutions — and is defying expectations
What’s happening in Ukraine isn’t an outlier but part of a broader pattern. Warfare is one of many areas in which democracies regularly outperform autocracies. Indeed, our research finds that democracies have won their wars at higher rates than autocracies over the last two centuries.
Autocrats start risky wars
Three historically consistent patterns have emerged in the war in Ukraine. First, autocracies are more likely than democracies to start risky wars they go on to lose. Dictators are more willing to initiate high-risk wars because they know they can crack down on political opposition and remain in power if the fight goes badly.
Iraq, for instance, launched two disastrous invasions of Iran and Kuwait. Even so, Saddam Hussein crushed internal uprisings to stay in power. Democratic leaders often, but not always, avoid these kinds of military failures, fearing the domestic electoral backlash of wars gone wrong. This is why democracies tend to win their wars — and why they wage shorter wars with fewer casualties.
Like past authoritarians in Russia and elsewhere, Russian President Vladimir Putin has positioned himself domestically. He has steadily consolidated his hold on power over two decades, neutering the Russian parliament and political opponents, and destroying Russia’s independent media.
Putin is now using that unchecked power to crush minor outbreaks of opposition, even from 7-year-old children. By eradicating the last vestiges of free speech and press in Russia, Putin may have felt comfortable taking on the risk of invading Ukraine.
Dictators have to keep their militaries in check
Second, like most dictators, Putin probably has some concerns about being overthrown by his own military. Dictators guard against this potential threat by centralizing military command authority and reducing the ability of lower-level commanders to take the initiative in battle.
These moves may reduce an army’s ability to seize power in a crisis — but also undercut the military’s ability to defeat foreign foes. In its wars against Israel, the Egyptian leadership consistently restrained military leaders to lower the risk of an internal coup — but this crippled Egyptian fighting ability. Conversely, Israel’s willingness to grant command authority to lower-level officers has proven highly effective.
Putin’s army today demonstrates the calcification and rigidity of a dictatorship. He appears unwilling to delegate decision-making autonomy to lower-level commanders, reducing military effectiveness. One result is that many high-level Russian officers lead from the front lines, where they have been killed in large numbers. Russia’s lower-ranked officers are not prepared or formally authorized to fill that leadership void.
Putin is discovering that overwhelming military power can be a curse
The Russian military’s inflexibility may explain other areas of poor performance. These include Russia’s curious vulnerability to Ukraine’s slow but lethal tank-killing drones, and the decision to drive a 40-mile-long Russian tank column into Ukraine along main roads exposed to ambush.
Ukrainian troops, in contrast, are demonstrating bravery under fire combined with individual initiative — and inflicting surprising damage on Russian forces and supply lines.
Dictators tend to ignore the truth
Third, dictators often surround themselves with yes-men and political cronies, who deceive or remain silent rather than tell the unvarnished truth. Those in the inner circle typically reassure the leader that their vaunted troops will sweep aside the weak and corrupt enemy. In 1939, for instance, Joseph Stalin found out the hard way that invading Finland in winter was asking for trouble.
In contrast, democratic leaders are more likely to have the benefit of robust debate inside and outside government. In 1990, President George H.W. Bush heard the hard truth from General Colin Powell that victory over Iraq would require a massive effort. Powell got the military commitment he said was necessary and delivered the most lopsided military victory in modern history.
What about Putin? Every indication is that the Russian president is isolated and getting poor information. His arch-loyal defense minister, Sergei Shoigu, tasked with modernizing the Russian military over the last decade, promised Putin rapid victory — then apparently disappeared from view for nearly two weeks. Putin’s generals and intelligence chief reportedly refused to tell him the truth before the war: that years of Russian military reform had not made substantial progress, instead producing a “Potemkin military.”
Actual combat is an unfailing truth-teller. Russian forces have suffered remarkable casualties and appear unable to execute basic battle requirements, such as implementing vehicle maintenance and providing troops with food and warm clothing.
The democratic advantage doesn’t always hold
Democracies don’t always get it right. Foreign policy mistakes usually happen when democracies act more like autocracies by stifling internal policy debates — like the lead-up to the 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion or the 2003 Iraq War, for instance. And mistakes result when democracies work in secret, as the U.S. record of covert action during the Cold War suggests; or conceal critical intelligence — as was the case regarding the insurgency in the Vietnam War, and in Afghanistan. But overall, evidence suggests democracy is an advantage in foreign policy and will be so in the coming geopolitical clashes in the 21st century.
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Dan Reiter is the Samuel Candler Dobbs Professor of political science at Emory University. He is the editor of “Understanding War and Peace,” a modular textbook, and the author of “How Wars End” (Princeton University Press, 2009). He and Allan C. Stam are the co-authors of “Democracies at War” (Princeton University Press, 2002).
Allan C. Stam is a professor of public policy and politics at the University of Virginia. In addition to “Democracies at War” (Princeton University Press, 2002), he is also the co-author of “The Behavioral Origins of War” (University of Michigan Press, 2004) and “Why Leaders Fight” (Cambridge University Press, 2015).