The next video in my series on theories of political institutions covers an influential theory of lawmaking in the U.S. Congress – Pivotal Politics – proposed by Stanford political science professor Keith Krehbiel in the 1990s. Among its many contributions, Krehbiel’s theory helps explain legislative stalemate even during periods of unified government, when the same party controls the House, Senate, and presidency.
This video explains the theory by incorporating some real-life features of the U.S. Congress into the simple spatial model I introduced in the previous video. Specifically, it explores how the filibuster in the Senate and the presidential veto shape the sorts of public policies Congress and the president can enact.
So many political scientists tell me that they struggled through Pivotal Politics in their first or second year of graduate school. I know I certainly did! Accordingly, my goal in this video is to explain the theory slowly and step by step. I’d also like it to be more accessible to a non-political science audience.
The video should be useful to advanced undergraduates with an interest in formal political theory or game theory, graduate students in the social sciences, and instructors who wish to supplement assigning Pivotal Politics with a different medium.