Americans are growing apart from one another – culturally, ideologically, racially, economically, and ideologically. Such divisions appear in many forms. Headlines talk about a partisan and often stalemated Congress, and the divide between red and blue states.
Polarization is the technical term for the separation between groups. Political scientists often prefer the term “partisan polarization” as they study how the divisions from “tribal” politics manifest across American politics and society. Polarization affects America’s governing bodies (like legislatures and even courts), as well as elites (including media sources and elected officials) and ordinary people (such as the American voters).
Polarization in legislatures
Scholars agree that the U.S. Congress – as well as many state legislatures – has become decidedly more partisan. The Republican and Democratic parties certainly have internal factions, and major bipartisan deals remain possible. Yet rank-and-file lawmakers increasingly vote along party lines and often reject the ideas of the opposition.
Not all scholars agree on these points. Are the two parties moving away ideologically from each other in terms of their views about policy problems and solutions? Or is the big issue that partisans simply disagree with each other more frequently? Either way, partisan disagreements make enacting policy change increasingly difficult.
Scholars often argue that polarization is asymmetric. Democrats might have shifted slightly to the left over recent decades, but Republicans have arguably moved much further to the right. That is especially likely in legislative bodies in which so-called Republican MAGA voters have elected far-right populists to office.
How did Congress get so polarized?
The literature suggests a few reasons. But this is not an exhaustive list.
1. Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.) rose to power within the House of Representatives in the 1990s. This created a sense of militancy within the Republican Party, some political scientists argue.
2. Many members of Congress are now elected from districts that may be gerrymandered, experience little competition, or have low voter turnout.
3. Primaries tend to have low voter turnout – and this can make it easier for less-mainstream candidates to land a spot on the general election ballot. In recent years, parties or activists with parties also started to attract and cultivate more extreme candidates. But most voters still vote for the party line-up, even if that means electing a candidate who is more radical than they’d prefer.
4. Over recent decades, the parties have sorted themselves ideologically, culturally, and socially. As partisans find their home in one party or the other, voters become less likely to split their ticket while voting. And lawmakers are less likely to cross party lines themselves to buck party leaders. Although the current House GOP majority has struggled to keep members on the same page in the 118th Congress (2023-24), both parties have tried to centralize authority in party leaders’ hands. That gives party leaders a prominent role in setting the agenda and devising party strategies, further encouraging rank-and-file lawmakers to vote with the team.
5. Tight elections and slim legislative majorities boost the chances of divided party control of the executive and legislative branches – but also within the two chambers of Congress. Party leaders have an added incentive to bring measures to the floor to help burnish the party brand, or air the other party’s dirty laundry. This means both putting to a vote measures that divide the other party, or have no chance of enactment. These “messaging votes,” instead, are designed to help that party make its position and issues clear to voters.
Congress is divided, but are Americans?
The literature on whether the mass public has become more polarized is more mixed.
The U.S. public has fewer incentives to be clearly in opposition to alternate groups than members of Congress – voters, after all, aren’t running for reelection. In general, regular people have ideologically inconsistent policy beliefs, and spend little time thinking about politics. And regular people have to live in a society where they interact with people in various capacities. For many Americans, politics may not be the primary topic of conversation.
So, many people aren’t paying much attention to politics or burning out from paying attention to politics. They may not look particularly polarized.
However, among people that are paying attention to politics, or say they care about politics, partisan divisions appear deeper. Strong partisans are stronger than they once were, and more consistent in their views. They also tend to have policy preferences that align with the ideological disposition of their party (i.e., Republican partisans often tend to want more extreme conservative policies).
Why, exactly?
Here are two big reasons to consider:
1. The groups that Americans belong to – religion, race, geography, education, other identities – align together more than they ever have with one party or the other. This tendency cuts down on what political scientists would call cross-cutting social cleavages: the idea that we weigh competing identities to come up with our own political beliefs. When all of our identities align, it can push our beliefs to be more extreme – and pressure us into holding these beliefs to fit in socially.
2. “Affective polarization” – a strong dislike for the other party – has also increased. We don’t want to associate with the alternative party, have our children date them, or see them in our neighborhoods. As groups form stronger political beliefs (see point 1 here), it’s very easy to stereotype out-partisans as people to avoid.
Polarization – is it bad for democracy?
Well, it’s not good.
Polarization may be a major threat to democracy. The rapid rise in polarization means lawmakers have less incentive to cooperate, solve common problems, treat political opponents fairly, or represent opposing constituencies. If opposing parties don’t see themselves as acting in the same system, then the stakes of politics become that much higher. The party that loses an election, for example may see the setback as a major existential threat.
But polarization is more of a symptom of a problem rather than a problem itself. That parties in Congress want radically different policies does not mean polarization is bad. But it does mean that something is pushing the people we elect further to the extremes. The problem for democracy wouldn’t be solved with consensus if what people agreed on was un-democratic or anti-democratic. Instead, a system that elects candidates who do not represent their constituencies might be at fault. Or parties having bad ideas but still holding power might be the real problem.
If the goal for the mass public is to overcome polarization and work together, it’s worth asking what overcoming polarization would mean. A dinner where you sit quietly as someone announces their politics and you don’t start a fight is not fixing the problem of polarization, either. Overcoming polarization in Congress should mean that Congress passes better policies. Simply getting to the point where one party is able to overcome another and enact their favored policies isn’t really a solution.
In short, a greater sense of commonality, and the pursuit of collective goals, may be key to a well-functioning society, but political antagonism isn’t inherently bad. The questions of what we disagree about, why, and what that means about us, are important as well.
Laura C. Bucci is a 2024-2025 Good Authority fellow.
Related Good Authority posts
- Sarah Binder, “Good to Know: Continuing resolutions.” From January 2024, after Congress voted on another stopgap spending bill to avoid a government shutdown.
- John Sides and Michael Tesler, “America is less polarized by race – but more polarized about race.” From April 2024, examining shifts in racial attitudes among different racial and ethnic groups in the United States.
- John Sides, “Partisanship is not just negative partisanship.” From December 2023, this analysis offers a closer look at how we measure partisanship.
- John Sides, “How July 4th reduces partisan animosity – at least for a moment.” From July 2024, exploring the idea that a shared group identity can help overcome the divisions created by other identities.
- Michael Tesler, “Right-wing attacks haven’t dented Taylor Swift’s popularity.” From February 2024, after Trump supporters take aim at the popular pop star.
- Krzysztof Pelc, “Political polarization is draining America’s blood supply.” From October 2024, how partisan divisions discourage blood donations.
Further reading
- Alan I. Abramowitz and Steven Webster, “The rise of negative partisanship and the nationalization of of U.S. elections in the 21st century,” Electoral Studies, Vol. 41, March 2016, pp. 12-22.
- Alan I. Abramowitz and Steven Webster, “Negative Partisanship: Why Americans Dislike Parties But Behave Like Rabid Partisans,” Political Psychology, Feb.13, 2018.
- Morris P. Fiorina and Samuel J. Abrams, “Political Polarization in the American Public,” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol, 11, 2008.
- Marc J. Hetherington, “Turned Off or Turned On: How Polarization Affects Political Engagement,” in Red and Blue Nation: Consequences and Correction of America’s Polarized Politics (Hoover Institution and Brookings Institution, 2008).
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