Fighting corruption makes for thorny politics. In Europe, a growing gap between E.U. standards and the E.U.’s own record of compliance have undermined corruption control. Developments in 2025 suggest that without greater credibility and stronger enforcement, corruption only became a bigger challenge.
Once a pioneer in good governance, Europe has seen increasing levels of corruption over the past two decades. This trend has not been limited to Central and Eastern Europe, as democracies across Western Europe also saw their rankings drop in corruption indices. Austria illustrates this shift clearly. Once a leader in corruption control, Austria now ranks among Europe’s weakest performers. And Sweden, still one of the world’s strongest corruption controllers, has also shown a downward trend in recent years.
As corruption has become more salient, the E.U. has given greater attention to the issue. The E.U. has pushed anti-corruption standards for prospective new members, tied funding to good governance, and urged member countries to strengthen corruption control.
Yet some experts contend that the E.U. approach to corruption control has been limited. The big concern is that recent corruption scandals – which include allegations against E.U. institutions and officials – make these limitations harder to ignore. So does the E.U. have the necessary enforcement capacity, and are E.U. anti-corruption measures credible?
Key developments in three prominent cases
To answer these questions, let’s look at three current E.U. cases. These cases support two primary arguments commonly voiced in scholarly research. First, the E.U.’s effectiveness in corruption control depends on its credibility. That credibility depends on the E.U.’s ability to comply with the same standards it promotes to member countries.
On this point, the empirical record is discouraging. Second, cooperation with member countries matters, but effective corruption control also requires independent monitoring and enforcement capacity at the E.U. level. When enforcement relies primarily on the willingness or capacity of national governments, outcomes tend to remain uneven.
As I explained in an earlier Good Authority piece, the E.U. largely sidelined corruption as a policy concern until the late 1990s. Over time, the assumption that existing E.U. members routinely pursue good governance has become increasingly difficult to sustain. In 2025, several corruption scandals directly implicated E.U. institutions and officials, including these three cases:
1. Qatargate has questioned the E.U.’s credibility
Existing research suggests that the E.U. is more likely to serve as a successful role model when it complies with the rules it expects member countries to follow. Credibility depends on consistency – and internal scandals undermine the E.U.’s leverage.
Many experts consider “Qatargate” the most damaging corruption scandal in the European Parliament’s history. In 2022, Belgian prosecutors alleged that foreign governments, including Qatar and Morocco, used cash and gifts to influence parliamentary work. The investigation implicated several senior officials, and press reports included images of large sums of cash.
Qatargate created an opportunity for the European Parliament to prove its commitment to credible corruption control. Instead, progress was slow due to procedural disputes. European Parliament President Roberta Metsola initially blamed “malign actors” seeking to exploit the institution. European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen reiterated her earlier commitments to a common E.U. ethics body – but there was no apparent progress on that front. As of December 2025, the E.U. has yet to deliver any final judgments in the Qatargate case.
2. The Huawei Case has further weakened the E.U.’s credibility
The Huawei bribery probe reinforced this pattern. In March 2025, Belgian authorities conducted searches across Belgium and Portugal investigating alleged bribery by Huawei-linked lobbyists seeking to influence E.U. decision-making. Prosecutors asked the European Parliament to lift the immunity of several sitting parliament members.
The case quickly exposed institutional tension. Reports in late 2025 suggested that the Parliament slowed immunity requests. This episode highlighted how immunity rules become politically contentious in practice.
For many citizens, scandals like this signal systemic failure. As my research suggests, far-right populist politicians seek to exploit these double standards. They often combine anti-E.U. and anti-corruption rhetoric to expand electoral support. Their framing is particularly effective when enforcement appears inconsistent.
3. The College of Europe probe highlights limited enforcement
Corruption research emphasizes monitoring and enforcement. Rules alone rarely deter misconduct. Effective control depends on independent oversight.
The E.U. entered this field relatively late. Its first Anti-Corruption Report in 2014 briefly functioned as a comprehensive monitoring tool. Yet, political pressure from member countries led to the discontinuation of this type of monitoring after just one cycle. Scholars saw this as a missed opportunity to develop a coherent approach to corruption control.
Subsequent mechanisms, such as the Rule of Law Framework and the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Reports, have expanded monitoring. But their impact still depends heavily on the political will of its member governments – and that will has become increasingly divided.
The “EEAS-gate” case points to a partial shift in oversight capacity, but it also exposes a persistent weakness. Working through Belgian authorities, the European Public Prosecutor’s Office (EPPO) is investigating whether confidential information regarding the selection criteria for the European Union Diplomatic Academy tender was improperly shared with the College of Europe in 2021. In December 2025, Belgian authorities took into custody former E.U. foreign policy chief Federica Mogherini and senior diplomat Stefano Sannino. Investigators also searched the European External Action Service (EEAS) and the College of Europe, where Mogherini served as rector at the time.
This case stands out because the EPPO is directly investigating a former commissioner-level E.U. official. But national corruption enforcement channels also play a role in this case. Belgian authorities executed the raids and detentions, and the case continues to move through national enforcement channels.
Some of the lessons from 2025 developments
Building on Qatargate, among other precedents, these cases revealed a recurring tension in 2025. Investigative tools at the E.U. level have expanded, particularly with the creation of the EPPO. But enforcement still depends heavily on national authorities. And when those links come under stress, research suggests that enforcement slows and credibility suffers.
To its credit, the E.U. has signaled growing awareness of these challenges. It has moved toward a more integrated approach to monitoring and investigation. Still, progress has been severely limited. The developments this year suggest that the E.U.’s credibility and enforcement capacity will continue to shape its role in corruption control, both internally and in member countries.
Mert Kartal is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow.
Stay up to date on all things politics and political science. Bookmark our landing page and sign up for Good Authority’s weekly newsletter by entering your email address in the box below.
