European Chief Prosecutor Laura Kövesi summarized the European Public Prosecutor’s Office’s (EPPO) findings last month:
There is no clean country. Everyone is affected by corruption and financial fraud.
The EPPO recently uncovered organized-crime schemes targeting European Union agricultural subsidies and the E.U. Recovery and Resilience Facility. The investigations suggest hundreds of billions of euros are at risk – a stark reminder that corruption in the E.U. is neither distant nor contained.
European countries set a global example
For decades, European countries were among the global leaders in good governance. Some still are. Denmark and Finland, for instance, continue to rank among the world’s most successful corruption controllers. They continue to set the bar high for everyone else.
But the broader picture in Europe is troubling. Across the 27 member countries, E.U. corruption control has deteriorated since the early 2000s. And it’s not just the “usual suspects” in Central and Eastern Europe that are struggling. Austria, once counted among Europe’s least corrupt countries, has also seen an alarming decline in accountability
Corruption is estimated to cost the E.U. as much as 990 billion euros every year, or approximately 6% of E.U. gross domestic product. But the damage goes well beyond money. Corruption erodes the rule of law, fuels illiberal sentiments, and affects citizens’ daily lives in many ways, from how countries spend public funds to whether people choose to leave their home country.
The public sees corruption as a problem
Recent Eurobarometer surveys confirm what citizens already feel: In 16 member countries, at least three-quarters of the public believe corruption is widespread. About two-thirds of E.U.-based businesses share the same view.
My goal here is not to unpack the domestic causes of corruption in Europe. These are complex and country-specific. Instead, I focus on the E.U.’s role and capacity to address this problem. How did things get to this point, and what more can be done?
The E.U. was slow to prioritize corruption control
By the 1990s, institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund had detailed anti-corruption agendas in place. But partly because of assumptions that existing members were performing well on governance, the European Union largely avoided the issue for another decade or more. Early efforts (such as the 1988 Anti-Fraud Coordination Unit and the 1995 Convention on the Protection of the European Communities’ Financial Interests) were slow to take effect.
E.U. treaties define corruption mainly as bribery involving E.U. or member-state officials. This narrow definition leaves out more common forms of misconduct such as nepotism, cronyism, favoritism, and revolving-door abuses. In 2023, the European Commission reported that only eight member countries criminalized illicit enrichment – when public officials accumulate unexplained wealth. Penalties for similar offenses vary widely across Europe, from months to decades in prison. The outcome is a single market with shared borders but a patchwork of corruption laws.
E.U. enlargement rounds in the 2000s exposed further weaknesses. Initially, scholars expected membership conditionality to push aspiring members to adopt and maintain strong governance standards. But conditionality effectively stopped the moment a country joined the E.U. The E.U. itself had few effective tools to discourage post-accession backsliding. Hungary’s governance decline since 2010 is the most visible example, but similar patterns have appeared elsewhere in the E.U.
The E.U. tried to correct course in the 2010s. These moves included strengthening anti-money laundering regulations and establishing the EPPO to investigate crimes affecting the E.U. budget. The 2014 E.U. Anti-Corruption Report seemed to be a uniquely powerful monitoring tool. But political pressure from member countries led to its discontinuation after just one cycle, marking another missed opportunity to build a coherent European approach to corruption.
A new generation of improvements
The 2020s have pushed the E.U. toward more ambitious efforts. The new Rule of Law Framework and the Commission’s annual Rule of Law Reports provide a more structured way to track corruption-related developments in member countries. Moreover, the Commission’s 2023 proposed anti-corruption legislation marks a real turning point, by seeking to expand the legal definition of corruption. For the first time, offenses such as illicit enrichment, abuse of functions, and trafficking in influence would be recognized as corruption across all member states. The framework also seeks to replace the outdated 1997 and 2003 conventions and create a more coherent legislative foundation. If adopted, it will harmonize penalties across the European Union.
While promising, adoption of the directive will require navigating lengthy negotiations among E.U. members – and some of these countries are precisely the targets resisting stronger oversight. Implementation of the new laws, should they pass, will likely take even longer. Past experience with legislation that arrives years after adoption raises legitimate concerns about whether the current momentum can be sustained.
Nonetheless, the current political climate has prompted the E.U. to act more firmly than before. In recent years, for instance, the European Commission has frozen billions of euros in funds bound for Hungary and Poland over rule-of-law violations. Results have been mixed, but the E.U. has looked unprecedentedly willing to use financial conditionality to uphold its governance standards.
Geopolitics and internal divisions are difficult to balance
The E.U.’s efforts to address corruption do not take place in isolation. Russia’s war in Ukraine has made rule enforcement considerably harder. Because major decisions (like sanctions against Russia or financial aid for Ukraine) require unanimous E.U. approval, support from each member country has become essential. That has given several leaders, including Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, a degree of leverage in Brussels that few would have predicted. In December 2023, for instance, the Commission released 10 billion euros in frozen funds in exchange for Hungary’s approval of budget increases and Ukraine-related financing. In situations like this, the pressure to keep the European Union politically united tends to overshadow the commitment to enforcing good governance.
Dramatic shifts in U.S. foreign policy have added another layer of complexity. The Biden administration’s push for multilateral cooperation on corruption was helping to bolster the E.U.’s efforts. But the Trump administration’s less predictable stance has shown that the E.U. cannot take transatlantic support for granted. As a result, the E.U. seems to depend increasingly more on its own internal cohesion, ironically at the very moment when anti-E.U. parties are gaining influence in several member countries and in the European Parliament.
These dynamics point to a larger challenge: The E.U.’s ability to fight corruption still hinges on the political will of its member governments, and that will is becoming increasingly divided.
Restoring credibility and moving forward
The E.U. also appears to face a credibility problem. Scholars have long criticized leaders in Brussels for coming down hard on corruption in some member countries while turning a blind eye to others with similar problems.
To make matters worse, internal scandals, such as Qatargate and more recent accusations surrounding former Justice Commissioner Didier Reynders, further erode public trust in the European Union. Experts argue that the E.U.’s painfully slow institutional response suggests these scandals are structural failures, not just isolated incidents.
In a recent paper, I show how far-right parties have exploited this erosion of trust in the E.U. Illiberal politicians weaponize the public’s frustration and adeptly blend anti-E.U. rhetoric with anti-corruption outrage to gain electoral support.
How to build a sustainable anti-corruption regime
If the E.U. wants to decrease corruption, my research suggests focusing on three priorities. First, E.U. officials will find it increasingly difficult to demand top-tier integrity from member countries while keeping a much looser set of rules for themselves. Putting its own house in order first would be a logical first step before the E.U. can credibly demand more from its member countries.
Second, there’s a need for stronger monitoring and enforcement efforts at the national level. The E.U. could insist on using financial tools (such as linking funding to the rule of law) transparently and fairly, for instance, even if these moves cause political discomfort.
Third, research consistently shows that civil society groups, investigative journalists, and independent watchdogs on the ground play an important role in driving successful anti-corruption efforts. This suggests that direct E.U. support for these individuals and groups can be an effective tool against corruption, especially in countries where national governments may be complicit in corruption.
Europe’s corruption problem will not vanish quickly. Progress requires consistency and institutional self-reflection – and prioritizing support for those who genuinely seek to tackle corruption domestically. Otherwise, the European Union risks weaker governance among its member countries, and even stronger Euroskepticism in the near future.
Mert Kartal is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow.
