Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM) – an Islamist extremist militant group linked to Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) – has blockaded Mali’s capital, Bamako, since September. The siege, the first of its kind in Mali’s decade-long conflict, has brought daily life to a standstill. JNIM cut fuel and supply routes from neighboring Senegal and Côte d’Ivoire, leaving empty gas stations and electricity disruptions. Schools were closed because of the electricity cuts. In late October, the United States and its allies began urging their citizens to leave.
The outcome of this siege matters far beyond Mali’s borders. Human Rights Watch’s 2024 report estimates that 8.8 million Malians were already in need of humanitarian aid, with more than 575,000 displaced since 2023. And neighboring countries – many of which are battling similar insurgencies – could see an even greater influx of refugees and a spillover of violence.
JNIM’s goal is not just to punish Mali’s military government, but to replace it with their own rule. Yet Mali’s current crisis did not emerge in a vacuum. For more than a decade, the international community poured troops, aid, and diplomatic efforts into Mali, hoping to prevent instability in the country from spreading. With many experts now concerned that JNIM extremists could gain control of Bamako, the question is no longer simply how Mali got here, but what its trajectory tells us about the limits of modern peacebuilding and intervention. Why did the international community’s best tools fail? And is there anything to be learned about how to support Mali now?
Mali’s current crisis dates back to 2012
In 2012, separatists from the Tuareg ethnic group led a rebellion in the north of the country. When Islamist extremist militants co-opted the cause of the rebellion to devastating effect, the violence prompted the collapse of the Malian army and government. By early 2013, the militants were advancing toward Bamako, located in the south, threatening to plunge the entire country into chaos.
It was at this moment that the international community intervened with a multi-pronged strategy that combined robust military intervention, peacekeeping, foreign aid, and statebuilding. French forces deployed under Operation Serval (later Barkhane) to fight the militants, and the U.N. Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was established to help Mali restore state authority and protect civilians. The European Union and the United States contributed additional peacebuilding support through training missions and aid programs. The hope was that military firepower and international intervention would restore stability and rebuild state authority.
Despite these efforts, Mali’s conflict metastasized. Despite some initial defeats, the remaining Islamist militants regrouped in the rural hinterlands under the JNIM banner in 2017. JNIM launched a fresh wave of violence that inched closer to large population centers. Several flaws in the international approach became apparent. France’s intervention was overly militaristic and reliant on ineffective and illegitimate domestic partners. Mali’s own government and army remained weak, while corruption and internal divisions eroded the government from within. The Malian military, despite billions of dollars in foreign training and aid, remained plagued by low capacity and poor morale. When extremist fighters threatened army camps, military units were prone to desertion. Even more damaging, soldiers repeatedly committed human rights abuses against civilians they were supposed to protect, plundering villages and mistreating suspects. These actions alienated local communities, undermining any goodwill generated by the U.N. or foreign assistance projects.
Feeding off of popular discontent, junior military officers launched coups, and overthrew two governments in the past five years. The current junta government cast out the French and U.N. troops, criticizing outside interventions as neocolonial and complicit in poor governance in Mali. In their place came the Russian Wagner Group. For a time, Wagner forces helped Mali’s army recapture key towns in the north. But the real costs soon became clear: worsening abuses, eroding legitimacy, and a growing insurgency. The junta’s decision to double down on violent repression of the insurgency with its Russian partners entrenched Mali’s isolation from the broader international community, but also failed to stem the violence. JNIM attacks surged, leading to the ongoing blockade of Bamako.
Political science research documents some initial gains
The current instability in Mali overlooks some important initial successes. International intervention delivered early and meaningful results a decade ago. French forces halted the advance of Islamist militants in 2013, preventing the fall of Bamako and the collapse of the Malian regime. This military support was broadly popular in the country. Ultimately, however, Malians grew suspicious of a lingering French counter-insurgency presence that extremists, social media influencers, and politicians alike linked to colonial occupations.
U.N. peacekeepers also made important gains. In my book, I show how the U.N. mission helped prevent the spread of intercommunal violence by encouraging cooperation across ethnic lines. creating space for local peacebuilding in some of Mali’s most volatile regions. Ultimately the U.N. failed to sufficiently pair these types of localized successes with the top-down peacebuilding that has succeeded in neighboring countries like Liberia, Côte d’Ivoire, and Sierra Leone.
The biggest challenge for the U.N. mission was deterring violence by the Malian government itself. In my recent work, I explain this “peacekeeping dilemma”: U.N. missions rely on the host government’s consent and cooperation to contain rebel threats. Yet that same reliance often makes it difficult to hold government groups accountable for human rights abuses, corruption, and governance failures. The greater the reliance, the worse the dilemma.
Abuses by Mali’s security forces escalated
In Mali, the government, military, pro-government militias, and later Russian partners all contributed to cycles of abuse and insecurity. The international community had more than a decade to confront the Malian security forces abuses. Although the U.S. government, for instance, made some efforts to sanction the Malian government, especially the military junta, these moves were unevenly enforced and severely delayed. More problematically, the U.N., the U.S., and the E.U. continued to invest heavily in a regime that was quietly becoming one of the primary drivers of the country’s instability.
Yet the withdrawal of France and the U.N. has only made matters worse. Other countries, primarily China, Russia, and junta partners in Niger and Burkina Faso, quickly filled the resulting vacuum. Russia’s emergence, particularly through the Wagner Group, has proven especially destructive, reinforcing government repression and accelerating the collapse of fragile efforts at stabilization and political reform.
The U.S. approach under the second Trump administration has been uneven and ineffective. With the Europeans and the U.N. peacekeepers gone, a U.S. presence in Mali is more important than ever. To date, however, the Trump administration has shown little willingness to engage substantively. The destruction of USAID early in 2025, moreover, ended several successful development and peacebuilding programs, including a program for social cohesion President Trump mocked in his March 4 address to Congress.
The result by the end of 2025 is a crowded and fragmented landscape of foreign influence in Mali, with few groups or institutions prioritizing civilian protection or long-term stability. As international engagement has receded, Mali’s crisis has deepened, and reassembling the old intervention does not seem possible. The big question now is how to prevent conditions from worsening further.
What could the international community do now?
If the international community takes a stronger interest in mitigating the worst effects of Mali’s ongoing crisis, what might prevent the situation for Mali’s civilian population from getting worse? Several options come to mind, including delivering targeted resources to the areas most at risk, particularly those suffering from isolation, displacement, or the ongoing economic siege. Access to fuel, for instance, has now become a tactical battleground. Monitoring and securing vital supply routes, even temporarily, could help relieve JNIM’s pressure on civilians and prevent further economic uncertainty and instability.
Key partners for the international community to consider are regional allies hardest hit by the blockade: Côte d’Ivoire and Senegal. Mali makes up a majority of petroleum exports for each country. The highway running west to east between Dakar, the port capital of Senegal, and Bamako is especially important and vulnerable to attacks by JNIM.
It’s unclear what the current U.S. administration might be willing to support in Mali. However, the Trump administration may have diplomatic openings that the Biden administration did not have, including more pragmatic engagement with Mali’s military junta and its Russian allies.
Another possibility is deeper collaboration in Mali between Western countries and China. Unlike Russia, China is not implicated in Mali’s civilian abuses. China also has an established and ongoing footprint in Mali through Belt and Road investment projects and U.N peacekeeping contributions. Beijing has an interest in Mali, along with leverage with the current government.
Ultimately, there is much to learn from past international assistance efforts in Mali – but few analysts expect to see any moves to resurrect the French counterinsurgency, U.N. peacekeeping efforts, or even U.S. assistance programs in Mali. The experience of the last decade suggests that international intervention can create the space for local-level peacebuilding, while poorly chosen partnerships can deepen instability. As foreign influence in the region shifts and the United States and Europe turn inward, the outcome of JNIM’s ongoing siege will likely serve as a bellwether for the future of countries plagued by extremist violence in the emerging international order.
William G. Nomikos is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow, and the author of Local Peace, International Builders (Cambridge University Press, 2025).
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