Vladimir Putin’s war in Ukraine — and reports of heavy Russian troop losses — are testing Moscow’s military strength, many analysts argue. But the “special military operation” in Ukraine since Feb. 24 also strains Russia’s ability to achieve its objectives across conflict areas in Syria and northern Africa.
Putin’s annual Victory Day speech, on May 9, and a recent statement from the Russian Duma suggest Russia is unlikely to launch a general military mobilization to address personnel shortages, although some analysts argue that the country’s military institutions are in the midst of a secret recruitment and planning phase of a “covert mobilization campaign.”
It’s possible that Russia’s Defense Ministry could place a stop-move order on conscript redeployment, preventing 130,000 current conscripts from ending their obligatory military service term later this year. And Russia might try to draft conscripts at higher-than-normal levels or implement an out-of-cycle draft. However, either option would probably undercut Putin’s repeated assurances to the Russian people that operations in Ukraine are “going to plan” and, thus, seem unlikely.
What does this mean for Russia’s conflicts elsewhere — and the tens of thousands of Russian troops and mercenaries deployed to those missions? An estimated 1,000 Syrian and Russian mercenaries deployed to Libya reportedly have left northern Africa. Pursuit of a “victory” in Ukraine — however Putin chooses to define it — seems almost certain to reallocate Russian troops from Syria in the near future.
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Moscow probably believes it can shift troops from Syria without risking Russia’s primary objective there — ensuring Bashar al-Assad remains in power. Some might view a reduced Russian role in support of Assad’s regime as a positive development. But our assessment is that these shifts could create significant risks of renewed fighting as well as escalate tensions between Israel and Iran.
Will Iran play a greater role in Syria?
If Moscow decides to remove significant troops, the Assad regime will lean more heavily on Iran and its Revolutionary Guard Corps to maintain control over previously contested areas, and to continue fighting the opposition and extremist Sunni groups.
Moscow and Tehran’s relationship throughout the civil war has been riddled with antagonism — the two sides often jostle for tactical control in some areas and disagree on Syria’s postwar reconstruction, and economic, political and military policies. However, both countries manage to coordinate when necessary and to carve out semiautonomous operational spheres elsewhere. And Iran is one of the few countries to express support and solidarity with Russia’s campaign in Ukraine and — and, like Russia, to pin the blame on NATO expansion — suggesting that ties between the two countries may have strengthened.
So long as the overall goal of perpetuating Assad’s regime is not threatened, Russia may be willing to pass the reins of tactical fighting in some areas to the Revolutionary Guard and other pro-Iran groups. Soliciting Iranian support appears a likely reason for Assad’s visit to Iran in early May and meetings with Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s supreme leader, and President Ebrahim Raisi. Some reports indicate that Iranian troops have already deployed to fill the void left by the Russian troops now heading to Ukraine.
How might Israel respond?
But an increase in Iranian troop levels and activity in Syria would probably attract further Israeli strikes in Syria. Even a partial Russian withdrawal presents Iran an opportunity to become more entrenched in Syria — and further its regional aims.
Ukraine war has side effects on Middle East geopolitics
Israeli leaders aren’t likely to see Iranian forces as a qualitative placeholder for departed Russian troops — or welcome further Iranian encroachment. Israel has already conducted hundreds of strikes against Iranian forces and Iran-backed Hezbollah fighters in Syria throughout the past decade of civil war. More Iranian fighters in Syria risks escalating the conflict if Israel responds to the shift in troop levels by stepping up efforts to target these forces.
Renewed fighting is likely
Increased fighting may result, particularly in areas where the Russian presence provided some stability. Fighting between pro-Assad and opposition forces occurred in Daraa, southern Syria, in summer of 2021. The area came under regime control in 2018 but has since shown many signs of active civil and military resistance to Assad’s rule. Notably, Russia was the mediator both in 2018 and 2021. A decreased Russian presence in 2022 could result in renewed armed resistance.
At times, Russia’s military has also played a stabilizing role in northern Syria. In 2020, for instance, Moscow was able to negotiate the terms of military operations and cease-fires between the Syrian regime and the opposition, Turkey and Turkish-supported militias, and Kurdish forces near Idlib and in northern Syria.
Upholding the integrity of these cease-fires would require only a minimal Russian force, so a full withdrawal of Russian troops from these areas is very unlikely. But in the improbable scenario that Russia conducted a full withdrawal, a period of heightened fighting would probably ensue.
Iran would probably not have the diplomatic pull to perpetuate the same agreements. The Assad regime’s strategy of ensuring total capitulation via indiscriminate violence could reemerge in the absence of Russian negotiations. And anti-Assad rebels in the north might feel emboldened by Russia’s absence to seize the opportunity to regain control over some areas.
Balancing Syria and Ukraine
Ukraine outweighs Syria on Russia’s scale of strategic priorities. Absent a full-scale general military mobilization — which appears unlikely for now — the current personnel conundrum could oblige Moscow to reallocate fighters in Syria to tackle higher-priority objectives in Ukraine. This could generate significant risk of conflict escalation in Syria and destabilize the uneasy status quo.
Of course, Russia has invested heavily in Syria and isn’t likely to fully withdraw from this conflict in the near term. This suggests the scope and footprint of Russia’s continued presence in Syria is highly contingent on Moscow’s increasingly uncertain prospects for success in Ukraine.
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Tiina Hyyppä (@hyyppati) is a doctoral researcher at the University of Helsinki. Her research is funded by the Alfred Kordelin Foundation and the Finnish Institute in the Middle East.
Aaron Pilkington is an Air Force analyst of Middle East affairs and a doctoral student at the Josef Korbel School of International Studies, sponsored by the Military and Strategic Studies department at the U.S. Air Force Academy. The views expressed are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official position of the Department of the Air Force, the Defense Department or the U.S. government.