After 15 months of devastating war, Israel and Hamas have agreed to a ceasefire deal, to unfold in phases.
What is a ceasefire, exactly? Why are ceasefire deals often designed, like this one, in stages? And what are the prospects for this ceasefire to hold – or at least move beyond the first phase?
What’s a ceasefire?
A “ceasefire agreement” is exactly what it sounds like. It is an agreement for the parties in a conflict to stop shooting at each other. People often use the term interchangeably with “truce,” or “cessation of hostilities,” though there are subtle political and legal differences between these terms. Of these, a ceasefire has the most weight, because it denotes a binding agreement. It’s important to note, however, that international law does not operate in the way that domestic law does – there is no world government to enforce it.
Any of these types of agreement can be temporary – a ceasefire may have a specific end date or may be intended to last for an indefinite period – unless specifically designated as a “permanent ceasefire.” This differentiates a ceasefire agreement from an armistice, which is a formal end to the war. A ceasefire does have something in common with an armistice, however: Neither one settles the political issues over which belligerents were fighting. In contrast, a peace agreement directly addresses those underlying political issues.
Can a ceasefire lead to a more permanent solution to the conflict?
To be clear, the Israel-Hamas ceasefire agreement is fragile – and ran into political barriers in Israel even before going into effect. The current Israel-Hamas deal does not even begin to touch on the underlying political issues at stake in this conflict. But does that mean the ceasefire has nothing to do with the future possibilities for a peace agreement? Not necessarily.
Scholars of war and peace sometimes distinguish between “negative peace,” which denotes only the absence of active violence; and “positive peace,” which denotes settlement of the underlying political conflict and, ultimately, deeper reconciliation. Does the former lead to the latter? Sometimes – and this is the hope – temporary ceasefires open space for more permanent ones. And ceasefires to halt the fighting also can open space for negotiations over the underlying political issues. It’s hard to settle the difficult issues when both sides are actively killing each other.
Sometimes, however, ceasefires (and even armistices, as in the Korean War) can become effectively permanent with no settlement of political issues. Without the ongoing horrific costs of war, opponents might have less incentive to make the painful political compromises necessary for true peace. On the other hand, without the ongoing horrific costs of war, many lives are saved.
Why pursue a phased deal?
Like many ceasefire deals, this one is designed to unfold in phases. In the first six weeks, Israel and Hamas forces will stop fighting. Hamas agreed to release a first set of hostages in exchange for Palestinian prisoners, starting with three hostages, and then a few more each week. Israel will withdraw its forces to “buffer zones” within 700 meters of the Gaza-Israel border. Further withdrawals in two more sensitive areas (the Philadelphi Corridor along the border with Egypt, and the Netzarim Corridor – which bisects the Gaza strip and controls movement between the north and south sections – will take place more slowly. Israel will allow humanitarian aid into Gaza, and let hundreds of thousands of displaced civilians return to whatever is left of their homes.
During this first phase, Israel and Hamas are supposed to negotiate the details for the second phase: terms of release for more Israelis and Palestinians; a full Israeli withdrawal from Gaza; and a permanent ceasefire. The details of a possible third phase, including the return of the bodies of hostages who have died in captivity and plans for reconstruction of Gaza, are even less clear at this point.
Of course, the partial nature of the deal in the first phase will be frustrating to both sides, particularly those waiting for loved ones to be released, and those who want to see an immediate and permanent end to the Israeli presence in Gaza. So why create this system of phases rather than agreeing to everything all at once? There are two reasons. One is political – for Israel, in particular, the right wing is strongly opposed to ending the war before achieving “total victory.” Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has thus been reluctant to agree to a permanent end to the war.
The other reason stems from the deep mistrust between the two sides. By definition, negotiations to end war take place between parties that have been killing each other brutally, and that mistrust each other to their core. Each side has reasons to fear that the other will not uphold its end of the deal. Arranging the deal in phases means that each side gives a little, and only continues to give more if the other side is cooperating. This approach lowers the stakes of being “suckered,” by complying while the other side reneges. If all goes well, the gestures made early on help build a modicum of trust.
Will the ceasefire hold?
No one without a crystal ball can know for sure whether this ceasefire will hold for the first six-week phase, let alone longer. Ceasefires are precarious arrangements at best, and they often fall apart very quickly, sometimes before they even go into effect.
They can fall apart for lots of reasons. Sometimes the parties don’t really intend for the ceasefire to last; they agree to a pause – often, as in this case, under intense international pressure – but hope to use the time to regroup and fight again another day. Or even if they want peace at the beginning, they see some opportunity to take advantage of the other side that is too good to pass up.
Meanwhile, both sides fear that the other might attack again. Sometimes even when both sides do want a more permanent ceasefire, the fact that they mistrust each other so deeply can itself be the cause of war starting again. This creates what international relations scholars call a “security dilemma,” in which each side’s efforts to protect itself against aggression end up threatening the other side. Their worst fears can become a self-fulfilling prophecy.
And sometimes even when top leaders want a ceasefire to last, more recalcitrant factions seek to spoil the agreement. If right-wing extremists in Israel, or a hardline faction in Hamas (or another Palestinian group) wants to upend the peace, all it takes is a provocative move. Acts of terrorism, whether by Israelis or Palestinians, could easily spoil the deal. Ceasefires are so tenuous they can break down purely by accident – a rocket goes off by mistake, or a soldier kills someone at a checkpoint. Mutual mistrust makes the tinder so dry that even an accidental spark can start a conflagration.
Are there ways to make ceasefires last?
My research shows that there are ways to make ceasefires more likely to stick. Withdrawing troops and separating them from each other with demilitarized zones, for instance, can make accidents less likely, and help the two sides start to build trust. (Note that the “buffer zones” detailed in the current agreement are not demilitarized: They will be occupied by Israeli forces, so do not serve to separate the belligerents from each other.). And security guarantees provided by external powers (such as the United States and Gulf States) can help reassure each side that they will be protected if the other side attacks. Communication channels (like the one through Qatar that facilitated the ceasefire talks) and dispute resolution mechanisms can prevent miscalculations, nip problems in the bud, and give each side a way to respond to perceived breaches of the ceasefire without risking escalation back to war.
Peacekeeping missions – multilateral deployments of troops and observers – are particularly effective at making ceasefires more likely to last. While we tend to hear more about the failures of peacekeeping missions than about their quiet successes, peacekeeping can reduce the risk of another war by 80%. There do not yet seem to be plans in the Israel-Hamas agreement for a peacekeeping mission, however.
The danger of this ceasefire collapsing will be highest right at the start, and again at the end of the first six-week phase, if negotiations over the details of subsequent phases prove intractable. But generally speaking, ceasefires get sturdier over time. Ceasefires are inherently fragile, but if Israel and Hamas can make it through the early stages, peace – even if it is just the negative peace of no shooting – is possible.
Page Fortna is the Harold Brown Professor of U.S. National and Security Policy in the Political Science Department and the director of the Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.
Related Good Authority posts:
- Stacie Goddard and Tanisha Fazal, “How can international law protect civilians in the Israel-Hamas war?” From October 2023, as the U.N. Security Council debated ways to protect civilians in Gaza, in the wake of the Israeli response to the Oct. 7, 2023 Hamas attacks on Israel.
- Stacie Goddard, “Will new tensions in the Middle East draw the U.S. into a major war?” From August 2023, as mediators from the United States, Egypt, and Qatar met in Cairo, hoping to end the war in Gaza and defuse Israel-Iran tensions.
- Hein Goemans, Sarah E. Croco, Michael Joseph, Alex Weisiger, Thomas M. Dolan, and Page Fortna, “The prospects for a negotiated peace in Ukraine are bleak.” From March 2022, discussing three hurdles to a stable and lasting peace settlement in the Ukraine war.
- Håvard Hegre, Lisa Hultman, and Håvard Mokleiv Nygård, “U.N. peacekeeping really can be effective. Here’s how we tabulated this.” From June 2018, discussing the results of a study on peacekeeping operations.
- Lise Morjé Howard “Trump wants to cut U.N. funding — but peacekeeping saves money, as well as lives.” From March 2017, in light of the prospect of the Trump administration’s plans to reduce U.S. support for U.N. activities.
Further reading and resources:
- Virginia Page Fortna, Peace Time: Ceasefire Agreements and the Durability of Peace (Princeton University Press, 2004).
- Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton University Press, 2008).
- Michaela Mattes and Burcu Savun, “Fostering Peace After Civil War: Commitment Problems and Agreement Design,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 53, Issue 3, September 2009, pp. 737–759.
- Barbara Walter, Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars (Princeton University Press, 2002).
- Barbara Walter, Lise Morjé Howard, and V. Page Fortna, “The Astonishing Success of Peacekeeping: The UN Program Deserves More Support – and Less Scorn – From America,” Foreign Affairs, November 29, 2021.