On Nov. 6, the five Central Asian presidents visited President Trump at the White House. This was the tenth meeting of the “C5+1” – Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, plus the United States. And it was the first time the annual summit was held in the U.S. capital, and only the second time that the U.S. was represented by the president himself. What was at the top of the agenda – and how do people in the region view the United States?
U.S. priorities this year focused on deals related to critical minerals, regional transportation connections, and security coordination. Human rights concerns were not on the U.S. agenda, despite the fact that Freedom House’s Nations in Transit report called all five Central Asian nations “consolidated authoritarian regimes.”
A day of deal-making
The deals revealed last week include a joint U.S.-Kazakhstan mining venture worth over $1 billion and the sale of 37 Boeing jets to the national airlines of several countries. Kazakhstan pledged to join the Abraham Accords – the U.S.-led initiative aimed at promoting cooperation between Israel and its Arab and Muslim-majority neighbors – in what Trump referred to as another example of a nation “lining up to embrace Peace and Prosperity” on his watch. When asked if he would visit Kazakhstan, Trump replied that he “[doesn’t] rule out that possibility.”
Trump’s approach toward Central Asia appears highly transactional. The focus on business deals is a shift from the Biden administration’s stated commitment to support civil society organizations and protect human rights. The region’s authoritarian leaders may be particularly eager for U.S. deals – Russia, traditionally the most important player in Central Asia, remains bogged down in its war against Ukraine. Still, as I show using public opinion data, trust toward the United States remains fairly low in Central Asia, compared to Russia and, to a lesser extent, China. What does the recent history in the region, along with these survey findings, tell us about Central Asia and U.S. dealings?
Central Asia and U.S. foreign policy
U.S. priorities in Central Asia have remained fairly constant since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, when these five countries gained independence for the first time. The U.S. objectives have included enhancing security (the region borders Afghanistan), opening U.S. access to natural resources, and encouraging democratization and governance reforms. However, Central Asia was never at the forefront of U.S. foreign policy, in part because trade flows were modest and there was no Central Asian lobby vying for attention.
Nevertheless, the region gained greater strategic importance in the wake of 9/11. The U.S. military relied on air bases in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan to supply troops in Afghanistan. The U.S. dependence on the consent of Central Asian leaders to maintain these crucial supply channels meant that U.S. officials had less leverage to advance their human rights agenda. Indeed, after President George W. Bush condemned the Uzbek regime’s brutal crackdown on protesters in 2005, President Islam Karimov revoked U.S. access to the Karshi‑Khanabad Air Base. The U.S. retained access to Kyrgyzstan’s Manas Air Base until 2014, despite political upheaval within that country and pressure from Russia.
In 2015, toward the end of the second Obama administration, Secretary of State John Kerry launched the C5+1 summit. A primary goal was deepening U.S. multilateral engagement in Central Asia. Critical minerals have become an increasingly important focus of the annual summit, given that Central Asia holds vast reserves of minerals that the U.S. deems vital to national security. Kazakhstan, for example, is the world’s largest supplier of uranium, which is the main fuel in nuclear reactors. Nevertheless, analysts note that cooperation between the U.S. and Central Asia remains relatively limited. The bulk of mineral exports remain oriented toward Russia and China. One indicator of Central Asia’s marginal position in U.S. foreign policy is the fact that no sitting U.S. president has ever visited the region.
People in Central Asia have split views on the United States
But what do citizens of Central Asian countries think about the United States? To answer this question, I compiled data from 12 waves of the Central Asia Barometer (CAB) surveys from 2017 to 2022 (the last year for which data is available). This survey regularly asked respondents about their opinions of different countries, including the United States, Russia, and China. Figure 1 shows the percentage of respondents in the Central Asian countries who said they have a favorable opinion of the United States. Note that respondents in Tajikistan did not answer that question, so the figures below omit Tajikistan. And citizens of Turkmenistan – one of the most closed countries in the world – were only included in half of the survey waves.
The limited data for Turkmenistan suggest attitudes toward the U.S. became significantly more negative between 2019 and 2022. Across Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, about 50% of survey respondents reported a favorable opinion of the U.S. This figure has remained fairly stable over the 2017-2022 period. Survey participants’ uncertainty about the United States reflects geographic distance – as well as the limited U.S. engagement in the region, in comparison to neighbors like Russia and China.
Russia’s influence is waning – and China’s is on the rise
Russia has long been the major geopolitical player in Central Asia, reflecting its geographical proximity and historical ties to the region. Central Asia was part of the Russian Empire and, later, the Soviet Union. Today, many citizens of Central Asian countries work in Russia; their remittances fuel the economies of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in particular. However, Russia has become a much less attractive destination for Central Asian migrants in recent years. First came the covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and then Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Migrant workers from Central Asia faced further challenges last year, after Russian officials blamed several Tajik citizens for the March 2024 terrorist attack on a Moscow concert hall. Figure 2 shows how the region’s views of Russia dipped after 2022, most notably in Kazakhstan.
With Russia’s attention elsewhere, Chinese influence is on the rise in Central Asia – but not without controversy. China has long been interested in the region, particularly from the perspective of security in Xinjiang, the Chinese autonomous region that borders three Central Asian countries. Since 2013, Central Asia has also been a major focus of China’s Belt and Road Initiative – the global investment and infrastructure program Chinese President Xi Jinping announced in 2013, while visiting Kazakhstan’s capital, Astana. However, Chinese investment in Central Asia has also created environmental degradation and conflict with local workers. Figure 3 shows the steep decline in favorability toward China from 2017 to 2020, followed by a slight uptick in 2022. These survey findings suggest China remains a far less trusted partner across Central Asia than Russia.
Will Kazakhan get a visit from Trump anytime soon?
It is hard to predict whether Trump will pay a visit to Central Asia – and harder still to gauge the welcome he might receive from citizens across the region. On the one hand, the prospect of sealing lucrative deals with the mineral-rich countries across the region may encourage the U.S. president to make the trip. On the other hand, even if Trump does travel to Astana, it seems unlikely that Central Asia will become a U.S. priority any time soon. Currently, Russia and China clearly have a greater stake in Central Asia than the U.S. does, and more longstanding investments. And, at least for now, both Russia and – to a much lesser extent – China enjoy greater trust within Central Asian societies.
But given the level of uncertainty in attitudes toward the U.S., even minor efforts at cooperation could make a difference. Trump, for example, could certainly make progress on access to critical minerals, and thus energy security, even without making Central Asia a policy priority. The fact that he seems to place little emphasis on governance and human rights – points of contention for past U.S. administrations – would likely make deal-making even easier.
Isabelle DeSisto is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow.
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