In a Good Authority piece published last November, one of us examined whether the European Union could slow what researchers describe as an increasing wave of corruption across Europe. That discussion raised a deeper question: Do E.U. member states actually agree on what counts as corruption? With 27 countries shaped by different legal traditions and political cultures, practices one country sees as normal may seem completely unacceptable in another.
In classic E.U. fashion, the E.U. has proposed a straightforward answer: harmonize legal definitions. The E.U. Commission’s anti-corruption directive intends to replace older, fragmented rules with a common set of offenses. This reflects a familiar institutional instinct to solve E.U. political problems through legal alignment. On paper, at least, that looks like progress.
Yet scholars have long shown that shared legal language rarely translates into uniform enforcement. The E.U. may be aligning definitions of “corruption,” but differences in how E.U. members handle corruption may persist at the national level.
Why do common definitions matter?
A shared definition of corruption is essential for enforcement. Research on anti-corruption efforts suggests that enforcement becomes difficult when countries operate with different definitions of the same offense. If one member state treats a specific practice as criminal while another ignores this as acceptable political behavior, cross-border cooperation becomes uneven.
Transparency International highlights this exact vulnerability. When an E.U. member state moves to decriminalize offenses like “abuse of office,” it creates an enforcement gap, where crimes recognized in neighboring countries can no longer be prosecuted jointly. The result is predictable: Investigations stall, prosecutions diverge, and cross-border loopholes emerge.
A common definition also matters because the E.U. increasingly functions as a shared legal and economic space. Public procurement, financial transfers, and regulatory decisions frequently cross borders. Without shared definitions, similar behavior can lead to different legal outcomes depending on where it occurs. Experts suggest that this type of uncertainty undermines both fairness and credibility in enforcement.
At the same time, developing a uniform definition is politically difficult. E.U. member states differ not only in their laws but also in their political histories. Some E.U. countries define corruption narrowly, and focus on bribery. Others adopt broader interpretations and also define offenses such as abuse of office, trading in political influence, or illicit enrichment. This is problematic, according to legal experts. Matilde Bellingeri and Federico Luppi, for instance, argue the proposed E.U. anti-corruption directive’s attempt to turn international guidelines into harmonized E.U. offenses creates friction with deeply rooted national legal traditions.
How has the E.U. defined corruption?
The E.U.’s body of laws and regulations (the acquis communautaire) states that the European Union aims to promote the “prevention and deterrence of corruption.” But it provides surprisingly little guidance on what corruption actually entails.
The 1997 Convention on the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European Communities or Officials of Member States defines both passive and active corruption. Passive corruption occurs when a public official receives a benefit in exchange for an act or omission connected to official duties. Active corruption involves offering such a benefit.
This convention defines corruption narrowly. The focus is limited largely to bribery, and the convention leaves out offenses such as misappropriation, abuse of functions, or illicit enrichment.
Although the convention instructed member states to “take the necessary measures” to criminalize corruption, enforcement remained a national-level responsibility. The E.U. itself played little role in prosecution of corruption cases. As a result, definitions and punishments continued to vary widely across E.U. countries.
Throughout the 2000s and 2010s, the E.U. launched several anti-corruption initiatives, often focusing on financial crime and fraud prevention. Calls for a common definition appeared repeatedly in documents. These included the Vienna Action Plan, the Tampere European Council conclusions, the Treaty of Lisbon, and a 2003 Framework Decision. But research suggests meaningful harmonization of legal definitions remained limited.
How does the proposed directive revise the definition?
In 2023, the European Commission released its newest attempt to streamline its approach to corruption control. The proposed directive would require member states to adopt common definitions and push corruption offenses toward harmonization.
The directive identifies several offenses, including bribery, misappropriation, trading in influence, obstruction of justice, and illicit enrichment. Of these, all 27 E.U. members already treat bribery as a crime. The directive’s definition addresses bribery in several important ways.
First, the directive includes both passive and active bribery. This means both the individual offering the bribe and the official accepting it can be held accountable.
Second, the directive explicitly targets indirect bribery. This approach aims to capture individuals who operate through intermediaries – those who orchestrate bribery schemes without personally handing over money or receiving favors.
And third, the directive specifies that corruption offenses must be committed intentionally. Prosecutors need to show not only that the act occurred but also that the defendant acted intentionally.
Compatibility with member-state frameworks
On paper, baseline legal compatibility is already high. As signatories to the U.N. Convention Against Corruption, all E.U. member states criminalize active, passive, and indirect bribery. However, major differences emerge in practice. As the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS) points out, national prosecutors face severe practical hurdles that go well beyond the penal code. These typically include political immunity rules and a lack of specialized investigative resources.
The directive has also exposed a deeper political tension. The E.U. is attempting to establish broad, mandatory definitions of corruption. Some member states have been moving in the opposite direction. They seek to narrow certain offenses to reduce what they see as judicial overreach and administrative paralysis. Italy, for instance, abolished the specific offense of abuse of office.
Another problem is that prosecutors often find it difficult to show that the intermediary and the official are actually linked (even when there is clear reason to suspect such a linkage). The courts in Greece illustrate this challenge. Although the country criminalizes indirect bribery, its courts frequently acquit defendants when the connection rests on circumstantial evidence. The directive may have standardized the definition, but national or E.U. prosecutors still have to prove the network behind the transaction.
The interpretation of “intent” poses another challenge. E.U. countries universally treat bribery as an intentional crime – but scholars note that courts differ in what they require to prove it. The directive also does not explicitly define what it means to act “intentionally.” This creates room for different interpretations across national courts. Some judges may require only proof that an official knowingly accepted a benefit. Others may demand stronger evidence that the official intended to perform an official duty (such as allocating public funds to a specific cause) in exchange for that benefit. And others may require proof that the official knowingly broke the law. This ambiguity could allow defense attorneys to push for higher standards, which would make prosecutions more difficult.
A recent case in Austria illustrates how difficult it can be to prove intent in practice. The Austrian court acquitted former Vice Chancellor Heinz-Christian Strache on bribery charges because prosecutors struggled to demonstrate that he knowingly participated in the scheme, despite evidence suggesting the conduct occurred.
These examples highlight a broader challenge across the European Union: Even if legal definitions align, proving a defendant’s state of mind remains difficult in court, particularly with the application of vague legal terms.
Can common rules create common enforcement?
The E.U.’s anti-corruption directive is a serious attempt to bring coherence to a fragmented legal landscape. But harmonizing definitions on paper does not automatically produce agreement in practice. Research suggests that anti-corruption policies work best when legal rules align with how political systems actually operate.
In this light, the obstacles are political as much as legal. These challenges suggest common definitions must be strong enough to close loopholes but flexible enough to fit different legal traditions and political cultures.
Ultimately, whether the latest E.U. directive against corruption improves enforcement will depend less on its text than on how it is implemented. The real test will begin once national courts and prosecutors start applying these rules in everyday cases.
Emma Birkitt is a JD candidate at Cornell Law School.
Mert Kartal is a 2025-2026 Good Authority fellow.
