A Burundian woman votes in a polling station in the Kinama neighborhood in Bujumbura, on June 29, 2015. (Marco Longari/AFP/Getty Images)
Events leading up to this summer’s elections in Burundi have seen no shortage of newsworthy events. Most recently, a coalition of opposition political parties have announced that they would boycott the polls scheduled for June and July. This raises an important question: what do political leaders expect to gain when they explicitly avoid competing in elections?
At first, the logic of a boycott makes little sense. Political leaders and their parties have a goal of seeking to win at least a share of power, so why would they give up on any chance of representation in office? Despite this, boycotts remain a recurring feature outside of established democracies.
In recent decades, the vast majority of countries have adopted competitive elections as the central means for choosing leaders, renouncing military or single-party rule. Often, elections come well before the last elements of the previous system have disappeared. In many cases the legacy of the non-democratic past can be a real or perceived threat to the fairness of elections.
Burundi is an excellent example of a county new to democratic processes, as was evident in the recent presidential term-limit controversy and subsequent coup attempt. In addition, the current governing party, President Pierre Nkurunziza’s National Council for the Defense of Democracy (CNDD-FDD), participated as a rebel group in the 1994-2005 civil war, and one of the main opposition parties, the Union for National Progress (UPRONA) was the non-democratic ruling party from independence to 1993.
This potential (or real) threat to the fairness of an election is one of the primary reasons a party would consider boycotting an election. Opposition parties may also do so for a variety of other reasons including masking their unpopularity and attracting the attention of international election observers. In any case, a party deciding to boycott an election is making a decision that their defeat in the short term will provide a potential benefit in the long term.
Events leading up to this summer’s elections in Burundi have given a number of reasons for opponents of the government to be concerned about potential fairness. A Constitutional Court ruling allowing Nkurunziza to seek a third term in office has led to serious concerns in a region where many leaders have used unfair elections to become de facto president for life. Past elections also had a history of tension between Hutu and Tutsi parties and supporters after over a decade of civil war.
So what are the gains to be expected from a boycott? My research on the impacts of boycotts on the survival of incumbents shows that there are some clear benefits to opposition parties that boycott elections.
The downside of a boycott for opposition politicians is the most obvious: when an election is boycotted, the incumbent is much more likely to win that election. What does change is the likelihood that the incumbent government will be defeated in subsequent elections. This finding only applies to defeat in elections, as there is not an increased risk of a violent removal of the incumbent associated with a boycott.
This appears to be the result of a few potential processes. When the opposition boycotts an election, they not only deny the government the legitimacy derived from holding a competitive election, but also deny the government crucial information on the level of support for opposition platforms and candidates. Boycotts can also lead to the formation of unified opposition coalitions out of a disparate and disaffected opposition, as occurred following the 2005 Venezuelan boycott.
Boycotts may be able to bring about a change in power through elections, but that change in power is not necessarily an indicator of a strengthening of the institutions of democratic competition. When there is electoral turnover after a boycott, the new government usually shows less respect for political competition than the government it replaced.
These findings means that the answer to how effective boycotts are remains in the eye of the beholder. From the perspective of an incumbent government facing a potential boycott, a boycott should be seen as a potential threat to remaining in power in the long term. If the goal is to promote democratic competition, boycotts appear to be one step forward and two steps backward.
As an opposition party, the waters remain muddy. Boycotts weaken the ability of an incumbent to hold onto power over time, but that does not necessarily mean that the opposition party that boycotts is the one that benefits from this change. Boycotting may weaken individual opposition parties along with the incumbent.
In light of these findings, what can be expected after this summer’s elections in Burundi? First, it is almost certain that this election will end with Nkurunziza reelected to a third term by a large margin and his CNDD-FDD party taking the vast majority of seats in the National Assembly. Nkurunziza’s government will face a higher chance of defeat in future elections, particularly if the fragmented Hutu opposition parties are able to form a unified opposition bloc in 2020 and onward (particularly because, despite the recent court ruling, Nkurunziza must either find a successor or alter/eliminate term limits by 2020). If the CNDD-FDD does fall from power violently in the coming years, it will not be because the election boycott led to an abandonment of electoral politics, but instead is more likely to be due to the usual suspects like rival factions in the ruling party or a military coup, ethnic violence, or mass protests in the capital.
Finally, the outlook for competitive democracy is not exceptionally bright even if the CNDD-FDD is defeated in 2020. Although nothing is certain, it is likely that whatever party or coalition wins, it will continue to hold elections of questionable fairness and the new opposition will once again consider the option of boycotting future elections.
Ian O. Smith recently received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Georgia State University. His primary research areas cover non-democratic political parties and protest in semi-democratic elections.
