Just over a week ago, and 11 years after killing al-Qaeda founder Osama bin Laden, the United States killed bin Laden’s successor Ayman al-Zawahiri with a drone strike in Kabul. Zawahiri led the Egyptian Islamic Jihad until its merger with al-Qaeda in 2001, and then led al-Qaeda from May 2011 until his death. Unlike al-Qaeda’s more charismatic and ideologically passionate founder, Zawahiri’s leadership was reserved and restrained. Some criticized that style as weak and ineffective; under him, al-Qaeda split with its affiliate in Syria, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic State rose, declared a caliphate in 2014 and then declined with territorial losses.
Nevertheless, Zawahiri managed the organization during a time when Western counterterrorism efforts focused on the Islamic State. He kept the loyalty of many of al-Qaeda’s affiliated organizations and its key senior leaders. According to the international relations scholars Tricia Bacon and Elizabeth Grimm, Zawahiri served as “caretaker of bin Laden’s legacy” — and succeeded in maintaining al-Qaeda’s ideological and organizational coherence.
Nevertheless, his death probably won’t weaken the organization. In fact, under new leadership, al-Qaeda now has a new and significant opportunity for growth and increased influence.
Does killing terrorist groups’ leaders work?
In my book, I examine whether capturing or killing terrorist leaders — or what political scientists call “leadership decapitation” — works to reduce terrorist attacks or dismantle terrorist groups. Examining more than 1,000 instances of such decapitation from 1970 to 2016 revealed that the strategy doesn’t really work against religious, separatist, Islamist extremist, larger and older organizations. In fact, sometimes decapitation actually prompts groups to launch more terrorist attacks more often. Why?
These three factors made the difference in whether decapitation hurt or inspired a terrorist group: organizational structure, popular support and ideology.
Organizational structures make a big difference
First, a terrorist group’s ability to withstand decapitation depends on how it is structured. Some are structured like bureaucracies, with standard operating procedures, administrative responsibilities divided among various lieutenants, and clear lines of succession. Groups structured this way are more likely to remain stable after a leader dies. Under bin Laden, al-Qaeda developed a bureaucratic organization structure. As a result, after he was killed, al-Qaeda swiftly elevated al-Zawahiri as his successor, minimizing uncertainty about the organization’s future.
While al-Qaeda has not yet announced its plans for al-Zawahiri’s successor, the group retains the conditions it needs for a smooth leadership transition. Its Shura Council, its executive leadership responsible for coordinating and approving major operations, remains active. Many analysts have speculated that the organization might select Saif al-Adel, a longtime al-Qaeda operative, as Zawahiri’s successor. Adel has considerable military and operational expertise and has garnered respect from the group’s leadership. He has the skills and experience to inspire loyalty, strengthen the group’s organizational structure and secure its affiliate relationships.
Terrorist groups also have found considerable benefits to organizational decentralization. Al-Qaeda has done this as well by expanding its network of affiliated organizations, or Islamist militant groups, operating in Africa, Asia and the Middle East that have sworn allegiance to its leader. These affiliates largely focus on local and regional agendas but can mobilize toward al-Qaeda’s transnational goals.
As a result, al-Qaeda has a hybrid structure, hierarchical at the top and decentralized at the lower operation levels, which makes it especially resilient after decapitation. Zawahiri provided the affiliates operational and financial support, thereby expanding al-Qaeda’s geographic reach and gaining recruits. While affiliates often have considerable autonomy, the core can offer an overarching ideological orientation. All of that remains despite Zawahiri’s death.
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Ideological strength matters as well
Second, decapitation is less likely to undo religious organizations, specifically Islamist extremist groups, because their ideology is coherent, self-reinforcing, and doesn’t depend on a specific leader to survive. The religious motivations transcend the leadership itself.
Bin Laden was particularly adept at broadening al-Qaeda’s ideological appeal, through rhetoric that highlighted its commitment to both national causes and the global Islamist extremist movement. Al-Qaeda’s propaganda arm was successful at messaging, enlarging support and securing ideological adherence from its affiliated groups. Zawahiri continued these efforts.
Local support offers critical resources
Finally, terrorist groups with strong support from the communities in which they operate can access critical resources, financial support, potential recruits and legitimacy, all needed to survive the loss of a leader. Al-Qaeda has done that effectively through its own and its affiliates’ messaging under bin Laden and Zawahiri.
Zawahiri’s death seems to have created an opening for a successor with the personal and operational skills necessary to re-energize al-Qaeda, expand its ideological reach to new audiences, grow its base of support, and continue strengthening ties with affiliated organizations.
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Sometimes, targeting leaders can increase terrorism
Sometimes, decapitation can embolden groups to launch retaliatory attacks or inspire previously passive followers to become active in the struggle. Terrorists often launch attacks after high-profile leadership deaths to signal that they have not been weakened and intend to continue fighting. The desire for revenge can be powerful, motivating existing members and other followers and supporters.
For instance, after a 2019 raid led by U.S. Special Operations forces resulted in the death of Islamic State leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, spokesman Abu Hamza al-Qurashi called upon Islamic State followers to avenge that death, which rallied the global Islamist militant community. Similarly, a month after a U.S. drone strike killed Islamic State leader Abu Ibrahim al-Hashimi al-Qurayshi this past February, ISIS Khorasan, a regional affiliate in Central and South Asia, claimed responsibility for an attack on a Shiite mosque in Peshawar, Pakistan, that killed 57 people and wounded more than 100. This attack was part of a retaliatory campaign of repeated attacks launched after deaths. Al-Qaeda’s followers may similarly launch retaliatory attacks.
Killing a terrorist group’s leader can reassure Americans that their government is engaged in the war on terrorism. It’s a highly visible, low-cost alternative to large-scale military operations or efforts to reshape governments. But policymakers may wish to be realistic about what decapitation can actually achieve — and consider the possibility that attacks on high-profile leaders may increase terrorism under new and more effective leadership.
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Jenna Jordan, associate professor and associate chair of the Sam Nunn School of International Affairs, Georgia Institute of Technology, is the author of “Leadership Decapitation: Strategic Targeting of Terrorist Organizations” (Stanford University Press, 2019).