There’s a saying: “If you aren’t scared, you’re not paying attention.” For a long time, that mood has undergirded a lot of popular discussion about democracy and democratic backsliding.
And when there’s a prevailing mood, people sometimes evaluate commentary and even scholarship not on whether its argument is correct, but on how well it affiliates with the prevailing mood. So if your argument is, “Donald Trump has authoritarian instincts but he isn’t going to create an authoritarian political system in the United States,” then people object because the mood is wrong. You’ll get flak for daring to say that things may not be as bad as some people think.
Now, a new book tries to make that exact argument: Democracy’s Resilience to Populism’s Threat, by political scientist Kurt Weyland. The change in mood is clear in the subtitle: “Countering Global Alarmism.” You may have heard of the book How Democracies Die by political scientists Steven Levitsky and Daniel Ziblatt. Weyland’s book could be titled “Why Democracies Don’t Die.”
Which populist leaders ended democracy?
Weyland focuses on how populist leaders (of any ideology) affect democracy as defined by its most basic formal characteristics – free and fair elections. Weyland wants to know when and why populist leaders can turn a democracy into a competitive authoritarian system in which it is very difficult for populist leader to lose an election. These leaders accomplish this by changing election rules via the legislature or a court packed with co-partisan judges, restricting press freedoms, and limiting the activities of opposition parties.
Based on Weyland’s data, there have been 40 cases of populist leaders in the Americas and Europe since 1980. In total, seven of them succeeded in “asphyxiating” democracy while they were in power: Alberto Fujimori in Peru, Hugo Chávez in Venezuela, Nayib Bukele in El Salvador, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Turkey, Evo Morales in Bolivia, and Rafael Correa in Ecuador.
Weyland then identifies two conditions that were necessary for these seven leaders to succeed.
The first is institutional weakness. Parliamentary systems are weaker when it is relatively easy for the majority party to change the rules. An example is Hungary, where Orbán’s party passed a new constitution – then changed hundreds of laws. For parliamentary systems to keep populist leaders in check, there need to be other political parties that help fragment power.
In presidential systems, democracy is at risk when a president can bend or override rules that would limit their power. An example is Fujimori, who suspended Peru’s legislature and legitimized his rule with a new constitution.
Populists look for a crisis to exploit
But institutional weaknesses alone are not enough. The second condition is a major event that the populist leader can exploit. In many cases, this is an economic crisis, like a major recession or a period of hyperinflation. This was true in Peru before Fujimori’s ascent.
Another type of major event is an economic windfall that a populist leader can use to expand government social programs and build popular support. Chávez took advantage of a windfall created by a spike in oil prices, which made Venezuela’s petroleum reserves more valuable.
A final type is a major security crisis. This happened in Peru as well, because of the Shining Path insurgents whose leaders were captured under Fujimori.
Weyland’s point is that the combination of institutional weaknesses and a major event like hyperinflation is relatively rare. This is why populist leaders fail to replace electoral democracy with authoritarianism, despite their efforts. Weyland argues that we can’t let the populist successes – which, to be clear, are important – lead us to ignore these failures. Like Trump, or Silvio Berlusconi, or Jair Bolsonaro. And many others.
Here are some important lessons from the book
FIrst, populist leaders are often incompetent people whose appeal is fragile. They are not magicians. They cannot create a crisis out of whole cloth. And they have little organizational heft behind them, since they prefer to stand apart from existing institutions and “elites.” They rise quickly but fall just as quickly.
Second, things that seem bad about a country’s politics might be good at protecting democracy. Take the U.S., as an example. There are many complaints about its sclerotic institutions with their many veto points. There are many complaints about strong partisanship and polarization – which, of course, is what has led many Republican leaders and voters to support Trump.
But at the same time, it’s exactly those features that helped keep Trump in check. For example, the checks and balances within the U.S. system prevented Trump from overturning the 2020 election: State officeholders certified election outcomes and courts ruled against his many lawsuits. Strong partisanship is what keeps Democrats united and prevents Trump from building a large popular majority.
Third, a populist threat may strengthen democracy, not weaken or end it. Populist threats create a counter-mobilization in civil society. We can see that in the U.S. under Trump and in Poland, where the backlash eventually ended the Law and Justice Party’s control of the government. “Democracy is stronger because of Trump” is not a take that matches the mood, but it might be true.
At the same time, there is a potential limitation in the book’s focus on the formal characteristics of democracy. In Weyland’s account, democracies fail when elections are no longer free and fair. That is a (or the?) crucial criterion, to be sure. But it seems like democracies have other qualities that populist leaders can degrade or erode even if there are still competitive elections.
Weyland does acknowledge this point. In his discussion of Trump, he talks about how polarization has “corroded” certain protections against executive power; how the willingness of most Republicans to vote against Trump’s impeachment or conviction weakened accountability mechanisms; and how Trump’s willingness to cast aside norms of civility “degraded democratic quality.” He acknowledges that U.S. democracy suffered a “reduction in quality” and that it’s a “major problem for democracy” when one party is beholden to an illiberal populist.
When do we worry?
So, at what point should those features start to, well, alarm us? And what should we do if there is no end in sight?
Indeed, other scholars of American politics – notably Paul Pierson and Eric Schickler – have argued that the strong partisanship of today has changed our Madisonian system, weakening the ability of separated powers and multiple veto points to constrain a would-be populist authoritarian.
That trend could easily continue if Trump were to win a second term. He may have more loyal appointees in the executive branch, possibly narrow majorities in both chambers, and a Supreme Court majority that seems sympathetic to an expansive vision of executive power. In Congress, Republican leaders already have to placate the party’s Trumpiest members. Mitch McConnell (R-Ky.) is retiring and Senate Republicans get a new leader. Will that leader be as willing to resist Trump? McConnell certainly paid a political price.
Weyland rightly notes that American political history isn’t just a story of linear trends and doom loops. Sometimes patterns are cyclical. Or downturns become turnarounds. But what would tell us to expect such a turnaround?
In short, read this book. Let it be a useful counterpoint to alarmism. But, as Weyland would no doubt agree, don’t let a lack of alarmism become complacency.
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