The United States and Europe haven’t been as successful as they wished in helping nations become more democratic, as Sarah Bush explained in her recent Monkey Cage post. But some specific programs have meaningfully increased the chance that a country will transition to democracy. Here’s one group: programs that educate and familiarize leaders from transitioning countries with democratic rules and principles.
[Democracy promotion is failing. Here’s why.]
In a recent study, political scientists Thomas Gift and Daniel Krcmaric argue that “leaders educated at Western universities are more likely to democratize than other leaders.”
This matters because, as other political scientists show, elites play a significant role in fostering and consolidating democracy, so the chances of reversal to authoritarian tendencies are minimal if any. The more elites identify with democracy by invoking democratic rules in their discourse and policies, the more likely it is that a country will transition to democracy.
Education and socialization can mean more than just going to an American or European university. Many of these leaders are alumni of educational and exchange programs funded by the United States Department of State. This includes programs, such as the Future Leaders Exchange (FLEX) program, Global Ugrad, or the Edmund S. Muskie Graduate Fellowship. Designed for high-school, undergraduate, and graduate students respectively, these programs provide funding for at least two-semesters of studies at a US institution.
[Say you’re leading a country. Does having a Western education matter?]
Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia are good examples of the relationship between Western-education and divergent transitions to democracy.
Georgia has numerous leaders who are alumni of U.S.-funded educational programs. This includes the current prime minister Irakli Garibashvili, the former president Mikhail Saakashvili, two other current ministers, several former ministers, as well as several deputy ministers.
Saakashvili, in fact, was behind Georgia’s much-celebrated democratizing Rose Revolution in 2003. At the same time, according to Freedom House Georgia is doing the best when it comes to democratization among post-Soviet countries that are still recipients of democracy promotion.
By contrast, Armenia, which has stagnated in its democratic transformation, has just one Western-educated minister who is an alumnus of a State Department education program.
Azerbaijan, which has steadily consolidated its authoritarian regime, seems to have no Western-educated leaders, who would have participated in these programs.
While the research suggests these programs support democratization, none offers explicit training in “democratization.” Participants’ own informal learning while in these programs seems to be changing their attitude towards democracy.
Of course, more detailed analysis is necessary to further support the link between Western education and the tendency to support democracy. For example, how sure are we that Western education causes a change in attitude and isn’t just correlation?
Even if it is just correlation, non-democratic regimes seem to believe that these educational programs have an effect on democracy in their countries. Take Russia as an example. In 2012 it passed a “foreign agent” law, which had the effect of expelling USAID and the American Councils, an education NGO.
Ordering the American Councils to cease activities meant cancelling the FLEX program. The program provided for a yearlong stay with an American family to learn about American culture and institutions. As it bans these foreign NGOs, Russia has reinvigorated its own youth-related initiatives. Russian President Vladimir Putin signed an executive order on the establishment of the “Russian Movement of Pupils” to “facilitate the formation of a personality based on the values of the Russian society.”
What does this evidence tell us about promoting democracy?
True, democracy promotion has suffered from a number of drawbacks ranging from one-size-fits-all approach to inconsistency, low credibility and counteraction from non-democratic regimes. However, the research also shows that the outcomes of democracy promotion are, for the lack of a better word, nuanced. This nuance is especially visible when we take a closer look at the various levels and sectors of democracy promotion.
In my recent book I analyzed how the U.S. and the E.U. have promoted free and fair elections, functioning political parties, and sustainable media freedom in Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. I argued that bargaining and persuasion between promoters and recipients — elections commissions, the government, political parties, and media outlets — is key to successful democracy promotion.
When the benefits of adapting rules and behavior to democracy outweigh its costs, democracy promotion is more likely to be effective. This likelihood is specifically noticeable in the changing behaviors of civil societies and oppositional democracy-oriented political parties.
While civil society becomes more inclined to keep the government in check through regular reports and discussions, political parties become less inclined to resort to election rigging.
Finally, when societal or political elites have already been socialized to the advantages of democratic governance, the entire process of democratization and the successful implementation of other democracy promotion projects are likely to be smoother and have higher chances of outweighing less-encouraging circumstances.
People who have already participated in democracy promotion educational projects often make the difference in transitions to democracy, proving that democracy comes to those who want it. And in some cases U.S. democracy promotion can facilitate that democratic desire.
Nelli Babayan is a fellow at the Transatlantic Academy (based at the German Marshall Fund U.S.) and associate fellow at the Freie Universität Berlin, and can be found on Twitter @NelliBabayan.