The idea of confronting China is now so commonplace in American foreign policy that it’s easy to forget that the question of whether China was a partner or a rival was a major topic of debate only a few years ago. Prominent scholars who study China have repeatedly and publicly made the case that despite the country’s growing economic, security, and diplomatic power, the U.S. should not treat China as the enemy.
This current debate was not the first time the United States was unsure how to treat a great power. After World War II, many U.S. officials thought the United States could continue to work with the Soviet Union (as it had during the war) to implement plans for a peaceful postwar international order. But that debate soon ended, and the two powers engaged in a nuclear arms race.
The debate over the U.S.-China relationship has been a much slower burn. Even as the debate still simmered, the U.S. has sought (albeit at times unsuccessfully) to strengthen its alliances to counter China’s power, turning to other global powers such as the European Union and India.
Yet, where some see partners, others see rivals. Both the Trump and Biden administrations worked to create stronger ties with India, but India’s side alliance with Russia makes any alliance fragile. And though the European Union and its individual members have long been U.S. economic and security allies, the Trump administration made clear its disdain for these historical alliances.
Which countries do elites and the U.S. public see as friends vs. foes?
To understand how the U.S. public and scholars perceive the current status of China, the European Union, and India, we conducted parallel surveys asking respondents a simple question: What do you think – are the following countries mostly rivals or mostly partners of the United States?
To capture public sentiment, we fielded the question to 1,000 U.S. households participating in a survey conducted by the Foreign Policy in a Diverse Society Project. This public survey was a nationally representative, probability-based panel survey fielded by NORC at the University of Chicago in early October as part of their October 2024 wave 1 Amerispeak Omnibus.
And to capture elite sentiment, we fielded the question to 5,026 international relations (IR) scholars across the United States as part of the TRIP XXI Snap Poll (Oct. 9-18, 2024). In all, 705 IR scholars responded.
International relations scholars in the U.S. were the least divided when characterizing China as mostly a rival (93%) – only 7% characterized China as mostly a partner. Among the general public, 19% characterized China as mostly a partner. Somewhat surprisingly, given the extent of anti-China trade rhetoric in recent years, people without a college degree – arguably those most vulnerable to the economic consequences of trade with China – were the most likely to characterize China as a partner (22%).
In contrast, international relations scholars almost universally (99%) characterized the European Union as a partner. Among the general public, 15% characterized the European Union as a rival, but this sentiment was strongest among those without a college degree (19%) and among Republicans (19%). These views were perhaps driven by the Trump administration’s scorn for European cooperation.
Sentiment towards India was the most varied. Only 11% of international relations scholars characterized India as mostly a rival, compared to 30% of the general public. Again, those most likely to call India a rival were people without a college degree (32%) and Republicans (34%). Despite Trump’s professed appreciation of India’s leader Narendra Modi, current research by Alexandra Guisinger and Elizabeth Saunders shows that Americans, particularly those with high levels of racial differentiation, may view racially similar countries more favorably as alliance partners.
The next Trump administration will no doubt reinforce some of these perceptions of friends and foes. But the international relations scholar community appears to have a tightly held consensus on China and the European Union – particularly on the strong partnership with E.U. members. In contrast, U.S. views on India are far less uniform, especially among the public.
While Trump purports to be a populist president and is focused on placing America first, his enthusiasm for working with Modi and with China’s leader Xi Jinping during his first administration seemingly ran counter to the preferences of the American public and expectations of IR scholars. While some experts suggest that Trump retains consistency in his guiding principles, others raise concerns about erratic changes in foreign policy, especially given his newest advisors. It remains to be seen whether the second Trump administration’s trade and defense strategies will be more strongly tethered to reflect the U.S. public’s and elites’ views of these partners.
Alexandra Guisinger is an associate professor of political science at Temple University, co-principal investigator of the Foreign Policy in a Diverse Society (FPDS) project, and author of American Opinion on Trade: Preferences without Politics (Oxford University Press, 2017).
Katja Kleinberg is an associate professor of political science at Binghamton University (SUNY) and co-principal investigator on the Foreign Policy in a Diverse Society (FPDS) project.
Anna Rowland is a graduating senior in the political science department at Temple University.
