We are coming to the end of the third straight presidential election cycle where U.S. foreign policy watchers at home and abroad have continually asked questions about what Donald Trump would actually do if elected. This air of uncertainty suits Trump, who has long embraced the “madman” theory that acting unpredictably is a good way to make credible threats and get adversaries to back down in confrontations.
In the 2016 election, Trump’s foreign policy was somewhat mysterious. In 2020, Trump had a track record from his nearly four years in office, but the pandemic overshadowed many traditional foreign policy questions. And the churn of top advisers toward the end of Trump’s term raised other questions about whether or not the team around him would rein him in.
In 2024, however, there is no mystery. Trump will continue to pursue foreign policy objectives in line with his long-held beliefs, and this time, he will not tolerate advisers who stand in his way.
Trump’s core beliefs have been remarkably consistent
What are Trump’s core beliefs? Thomas Wright identified these views in an article published a year before Trump’s January 2017 inauguration: Trump thinks alliances are a rip-off for the United States; he dislikes multilateral trade deals; and he admires dictators. As my research has shown, the beliefs that presidents hold when they arrive in office are “sticky” – in other words, presidents don’t change their core views much over time.
As many commentators have pointed out, what’s different this time around is not so much Trump but the people likely to be working for him. Project 2025 makes clear that Trump wants to gut the federal workforce. The New York Times reported that Trump’s team wants to bypass FBI investigations for security clearances. Unlike in 2016, when he accepted some advisers who brought government experience he lacked, Trump – who now knows much more about how Washington works – will not welcome advisers who might try to restrain his actions. Trump will be his uninhibited self, free to pursue policies he has always favored.
We know what policies Trump favors
So what are those policies? Look to those three core beliefs.
Start with alliances. For example, Trump has long viewed the NATO alliance with disdain. During the 2016 campaign, Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell said that Trump would probably have advisers who would see the value of NATO – and that proved true, to a point. But Trump also reportedly said he wanted to withdraw the United States from NATO.
Despite congressional efforts to “Trump-proof” any attempt to undermine the alliance, Trump could gut it in all but name. How? By using the vast power of the presidency: Trump could order U.S. troops home, he could refuse to appoint personnel like an ambassador to NATO, and he could continue to undermine the credibility of the U.S. commitment to come to the defense of NATO member states. NATO might stay on the books as a U.S. treaty commitment, but the actual U.S. commitment to NATO – the promise to come to the aid of any alliance member under attack – would be reduced to a piece of paper.
On trade, Trump has made clear he means to impose major tariffs beyond those he enacted during his trade war with China. In a recent interview, Trump said “the most beautiful word in the dictionary is tariff. It’s my favorite word. It needs a public relations firm.” If Trump wins again, his top trade adviser would be one of the few returning officials: Robert Lighthizer, who shares Trump’s favorable view of tariffs and has decades of experience with trade agreements.
And on his third core belief, admiration for dictators, Trump has been even clearer about his desire to emulate strongman tactics if he returns to office. During the 2024 campaign, Trump repeatedly suggested that he would use the U.S. military against his domestic enemies – or what he has called the “enemy within.” Last week, Trump’s former chief of staff, John Kelly, went on the record with his deep concerns that Trump wanted to rule like a dictator, and shared his recollections of Trump admiring Hitler’s generals. Some of Kelly’s views and recollections of Trump’s comments have been reported before, but his willingness to speak publicly at this late date suggests he does not think anyone would be able to stop Trump’s authoritarian instincts in a second term.
These beliefs would shape Trump’s foreign policy plan
There is little reason to doubt that Trump will try to pursue some if not all of these policies. And there is little reason to expect that he will appoint advisers or cabinet officials willing to disagree with him. Congress, moreover, would have little power to constrain who might advise Trump, since he has suggested he will appoint acting officials where necessary, sidestepping the congressional confirmation process. There is some reason to believe that Trump’s admiration for authoritarian rule would meet some resistance, if he tried to deploy the U.S. military against his domestic enemies. But compared to 2016 and even 2020, the foreign policies Trump would at least attempt to enact are relatively clear.
Of course, there’s still uncertainty in how all of this might play out in the international arena. Because Trump has so clearly signaled what he will try – and that he will not brook any resistance – his unpredictability act may not be believable this time. Of course, it was not particularly effective when he was president.
If elected again, Trump might find that the rest of the world is more prepared. Perhaps some countries will seek an early agreement to avoid or end tariffs – appealing to Trump’s desire for a quick deal. Other leaders might dig in and hope to call Trump’s bluff, especially on issues that they see as high stakes for their own governments. After all, Trump’s positions are not likely to change despite his talk of unpredictability.
What about Kamala Harris?
It is true that Vice President Kamala Harris presents some foreign policy unknowns, simply because she has focused on domestic issues for most of her career. She served as vice president under Joe Biden, a president who relished the foreign policy arena and kept that portfolio largely for himself. And a truncated campaign and the lack of a debate dedicated to foreign policy also gave Harris very little opportunity to make her views known on these issues.
But the range of uncertainty about Harris is much narrower than it was for Trump in 2016 or 2020. From what she has said on the campaign trail, there is little reason to expect Harris to depart from many of the basic tenets of Biden’s foreign policy: respect for alliances, support for Ukraine’s sovereignty, and continuation of the more limited tariffs that Biden himself continued from the Trump administration. Harris’ acceptance speech for the Democratic Party nomination, for instance, gave a clear statement on continued support for NATO, Ukraine, and U.S. allies. There is some uncertainty about exactly how far she might pursue tariffs, but she has drawn a sharp contrast with Trump, calling his proposals equivalent to “a sales tax on the American people.” The area that is perhaps least clear is her Middle East policy, but it is unlikely she would say much to depart from the Biden administration position until after the election.
There’s a huge contrast between Trump and Harris
Little wonder, then, that in a recent TRIP survey, international relations scholars saw “stark differences” between Trump and Harris. The differences between the two candidates are not in degree: Trump is proposing far more radical changes to U.S. foreign policy.
In 2024, however, Trump’s actions are far easier to predict. The candidate who wanted to be the “madman” and loved the idea of keeping other countries guessing has become a politician with a pretty predictable agenda.
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