A member of the Libyan pro-government forces is seen with a weapon during clashes in Benghazi Jan. 19. (Esam Omran Al-Fetori/REUTERS)
Libya has spent the past months moving from one disappointment to the next. Rival militias pound each other fruitlessly at the expense of the population. An oil-rich country with a small population is beset by continual power outages, unending school closures and hospital shortages. Ports, oil terminals and even the country’s main airports have become collateral damage in the fight for Libya’s future.
The elected House of Representatives (HoR) and its appointed government remain stymied from governing. A rump contingent of the former parliament, aided by militia allies, insist they are the country’s real authority and evicted the HoR to Tobruk in eastern Libya. The persistent insecurity has given rise to Ansar al-Sharia and other jihadist sympathizers. They have used a spate of strategic assassinations to drive out an incipient but once-energized civil society as well as most diplomatic and assistance missions from the country. It is thus no wonder that The Economist recently labeled Libya a near-failed state and a Washington Post editorial called for more assertive western intervention, including a possible peacekeeping force.
But all is not quite lost. The prospect of elite-driven “pacted” transitions went out with the mass revolutions following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Similarly, the Arab revolutions that began in 2010-11 didn’t leave much room for deals forged between old regime moderates and the long oppressed opposition (with the possible exception of Tunisia). Libya, however, could provide a unique transition model aided by a nuanced role from the international community, though it certainly has a long way to go.
U.N. Special Representative Bernardino León and his team convened a critical dialogue among Libyan stakeholders in Geneva on Jan. 14-15. The meeting took several months to organize, but it included enough key actors to demonstrate seriousness in the process so that those who elected not to travel to Geneva started making excuses for why they did not participate. Importantly, representatives of the HoR met side by side with elected members who had previously chosen to boycott the HoR’s sessions due to outstanding concerns over the HoR’s legitimacy and mandate. Also participating were some members of the former parliament, the General National Congress (GNC), although some of their counterparts chose to remain in Tripoli.
The tipping point for producing the initial phase of the dialogue was a delegation from Misrata, Libya’s third largest city, whose alliance with key Islamist militias helped boot the HoR and its allies from Tripoli last summer. By exposing a potential rift within the Misrata bloc, León may have created enough momentum to build on the Geneva meeting and aim for broader participation in the follow-up sessions, wherever they are held.
Whether he is familiar with the political science terminology or not, León is effectively trying to forge a “pact” among moderates committed to Libya’s pluralistic future and isolate those continuing to protect narrow self-interests, be it a radical Islamic state, the return of a strongman, or the fracturing of the country. A moderate consensus has to grow around two principles: Certain members of the former regime will have a chance to participate in Libya’s future (the 2013 Political Isolation Law passed by the GNC under heavy pressure from militias sought to bar even middle ranking officials from future involvement in state affairs) and the majority of the HoR and their so-called secular allies must accept that there will be some role for political Islam in Libya’s future. That possible consensus – or pact – could form the basis for rescuing Libya.
Those committed to the dialogue should understand that their role is transitional and time-limited. The HoR, the former GNC, and the current appointed government and its predecessors since 2011 were and are caretakers. The constitution is where Libya’s existential issues – governing arrangements, the role of Islam, oil distribution, the purpose of the military, treatment of former regime members – must be thrashed out and approved by the Libyan people.
But other than opening the tent as wide as possible to those willing to participate in the dialogue and hammering the message that the dialogue is primarily intended to produce a ceasefire, an initial disarmament and demobilization process, and temporary governing arrangements until the constitution can be completed, what can the United Nations do to propel the process?
The international community has to back up León, as it has promised, and impose costs on those who boycott the process or seek to sabotage it. In September, the U.N. Security Council unanimously voted to impose asset freezes and travel bans on Libyans deemed to be violating the peace and security of the country.. The Security Council reiterated that threat last week; however those harming Libya’s transition will continue to view such statements as feckless until concrete steps are taken.
A greater emphasis must be placed on enforcing the arms embargo, which has been on the books since the 2011 war, intending to block illegitimate weapons transfers to Libya. A show of force and weapons interdictions off Libya’s coast or at their point of origin would help support a ceasefire. An initial sanctions list must be proposed with key militia leaders on the list, and a travel ban must be enforced at the few international airports accepting direct flights from Libya.
A vexing problem has been the ongoing support of rival militias by regional actors, primarily Egypt, Qatar, Turkey and the United Arab Emirates. Since diplomatic pressure has failed to stop these actors from meddling, the United Nations should consider inviting them to the next round of talks, just as many western ambassadors observed the Geneva meetings. Full transparency in the dialogue process by regional actors might even compel them to encourage their Libyan clients to join the process.
As for a prospective peacekeeping mission, the same questions exist as were considered after Moammar Gaddafi fell in 2011: Who would lead such a force, what would be its mission and rules of engagement, and under what mandate would the force fall, particularly if Libyans didn’t want it? The NATO coalition couldn’t come up with good answers in 2011 and it seems doubtful that four years has changed much.
Ben Fishman is a consulting senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies and former director for North Africa on the National Security Council.
