I thought I’d add a few thoughts about the dynamics of Friday night’s Congressional deal.
First, in response to posts “here”:https://themonkeycage.org/2011/04/median_voters_and_the_budget_d.html by John and “here”:https://themonkeycage.org/2011/04/more_on_the_logic_of_the_budge.html by Scott Adler and John Wilkerson and “here”:http://staff.washington.edu/bpump/wordpress/2011/04/09/shutdowns-and-governing/ by Barry Pump, I think there’s still a bit more to be said about the interplay of legislators’ preferences and the reversion point of shutting down the government (that is, the policy outcome in the absence of a deal). With respect to the reversion point, the key issue is that _both_ parties took the option of shutting down the government off the table long before negotiations began. Democrats certainly did not want to see the government shut down — first of all because Democrats actually like what the government does and second because Obama’s White House has an incentive to show that it can govern (and shutting down the government pretty much sends a contradictory message). In other words, policy and electoral goals converged for Democrats, making it an easy decision to write off the option of a shutdown. Moreover, judging from reporting this winter, GOP leaders had similarly taken the option of shutting down the government over the FY2011 budget off the table. GOP leaders, as I understand, made it a key priority this winter to educate their members about the need to get the small hurdles behind them– so as to concentrate on the bigger battles ahead.
With both parties having effectively taken the shutdown option off the table, I was not surprised to see a deal reached. Nor was it surprising in retrospect that the GOP stretched out the bargaining until 10:30 pm before the midnight deadline. Since when does Congress ever finish its work early?
Second, with respect to John’s question about the power of spatial models in this context, let me offer the following observation. John asks: If we only knew the preferences of the House median and the Senate filibuster pivot, could we have predicted the outcome and size of the cuts? Granted, we lack precise data on these players’ preferences, but keep in mind that Boehner had resisted bringing a deal to the floor for which he would have to rely on Democratic votes to carry the day. Boehner had done so in passing the three week CR that was due to expire. But that did not go over well with his colleagues. If we assume that party leaders respond to their conference medians in no small part to ward off leadership challenges, then I doubt Boehner would have been willing to buck the preferences of the median member of the GOP conference in committing to a final deal. In Washington, reporters typically use the Speaker Hastert formulation that the majority party will only pass bills if a “majority of the majority” is on board. (Legislative scholars refer to “Cox and McCubbins'”:http://www.ucpress.edu/book.php?isbn=9780520072206 party cartel model.) I think it’s safe to assume that the majority party median is significantly to the right of the floor median. Given that Democrats conceded more cuts in the final deal than they had previously agreed to on Thursday night, the preferences of the majority of the Republican majority party seem to have dictated the outcome. When John Boehner vowed that there was no day light between him and the Tea Party, he wasn’t kidding. (Plus, no doubt he saw the Speaker-in-waiting Eric Cantor lingering in the wings.)
Third, I think the battle over the FY2011 appropriations was instructive for what we’ve learned about preferences within the GOP conference. Typically, with a preponderance of closed rules for party priorities, we know little about divisions within the majority party. But H.R. 1 — and the dozens of roll call votes cast– solved that problem. Most interestingly, the more you parse the votes, the more apparent it becomes that the key cleavage in the party is not between 87 freshmen and everyone else, but between members of the Republican Study Committee and everyone else. Given the economic and social conservatism of this key bloc, Boehner’s bargaining strategy this past week was brilliant. He strung the Democrats along threatening that his conference would only accept a deal that defunded Planned Parenthood. Hitting the Democrats on their “Achilles”:http://www.google.com/search?q=achilles+heel&hl=en&client=firefox-a&hs=7ql&rls=org.mozilla:en-US:official&prmd=ivnsu&source=lnms&tbm=isch&ei=yR6hTdOTG8PGgAer_InaBQ&sa=X&oi=mode_link&ct=mode&cd=2&ved=0CDYQ_AUoAQ&biw=1800&bih=840 heel, Boehner extracted additional billions of dollars in cuts– before finally Friday night trading a Planned Parenthood rider for a separate up or down Senate vote on the rider. Boehner clearly understood which preferences were pivotal in his conference for securing a deal. And, of course, with both parties having taken the shutdown option of the table, one party was bound to blink before midnight.
Finally, have you ever seen the Senate act so quickly? A “mere seven minutes”:http://cspan.org/Events/Pres-Obama-and-Congressional-Leaders-Reach-Budget-Deal/10737420771-15/, and the bridge CR was passed.