Azerbaijanis vote Sunday in a snap election that resulted from a sudden political housecleaning last fall. In October, President Ilham Aliyev dismissed his chief of staff, Ramiz Mehdiyev, and replaced a set of top officials linked to Mehdiyev’s “old guard” with younger technocrats. Azerbaijan’s National Assembly then agreed to dissolve the legislature and hold new elections on Feb. 9.
This was big news in an authoritarian regime where a single leader and his circle of close associates have structured the country’s politics for the past 16 years. Here’s what you need to know.
1. This could be a power play
Some analysts see the political shake-up as the sign of the demise of Azerbaijan’s old guard — and a consolidation of power within the family of first lady and First Vice President Mehriban Aliyeva (nee Pashayeva). The extended Pashayev family often found themselves in rivalries with the old guard, who are left over from the era of Ilham’s father, Heydar Aliyev.
According to some reports, Aliyeva hopes to become the country’s first female president and to succeed her husband, who is serving his fourth term (without term limits). The next presidential election is due in 2025, but the regime may orchestrate succession at any time.
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2. Azerbaijan faces serious economic woes
Oil and gas constitute 75 percent of the government’s revenue, and Azerbaijan’s petrodollars helped keep the ruling elites in power even through the 2008 global financial crisis.
But oil production has fallen since 2010. When crude oil prices plunged in 2014 and the central bank’s decision to float the currency led to a sudden devaluation, the government could no longer keep Azerbaijan’s economic problems at bay. The economy’s excessive reliance on oil exposes its vulnerability to swings in energy prices, making it imperative to implement structural economic reforms by boosting non-oil private sectors.
The “shale revolution” in the United States and renewables policy in major industrialized economies also made Caspian energy projects less attractive — worsening the country’s budget deficits. Several divestments by major oil companies further overshadowed prospects.
On top of this, an expected European Union-Azerbaijan partnership deal stalled in August when the sides failed to agree on some key issues. The E.U. requires World Trade Organization accession and tangible policies for spurring an open market economy, but these would undermine the country’s oligarchic interests — including, reportedly, the ruling family-affiliated business conglomerate.
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And there’s a youth bulge — but not enough new jobs. This new generation wants to see more opportunities and have a greater say in government affairs, perhaps another reason to suspect the government shake-up may be linked to forthcoming economic reforms.
3. But this is why reforms remain unlikely
In the absence of democratic competition and major institutional changes, the Feb. 9 election is unlikely to yield a fundamentally new parliament committed to profound economic changes. Azerbaijan’s elections are not real contests, and the outcome is often predictable.
Most likely, the new election aims to create a more modern and forward-looking parliament to attract foreign investment. There are three reasons to suspect this is the case:
First, Azerbaijan’s legislature has played a marginal role in running the country in the past — and a newly elected parliament won’t create a system of checks and balances. The president may simply be removing some competition to the ruling family’s plans. Aliyev “inherited” many members of parliament from his father’s era, but their loyalty to him personally — and more so to the first lady — may, at times, be questionable.
Second, the country’s old guard is likely to push back against serious changes. These are people who, for decades, have built the very levers of power that the Pashayevs may lack. These include not only business conglomerates but also extensive patronage networks, media outlets and supporters in Russia. Their demise would be a tectonic shift, and such a shift would probably have already revealed itself in the form of major popular unrest.
Third, it’s premature to claim that the appointment of more young people in the government would automatically lead to technocratic reforms. Some of the president’s new appointees appear competent — but a younger age and Western education do not automatically translate into technocratic skills or pro-reform views.
It’s not clear that these younger appointees are empowered to implement big changes. For instance, in one of his previous posts as minister of education, the new minister of economy, Mikayil Jabbarov, faced strong resistance to even modest changes. Efforts in recent years to professionalize Azerbaijan’s public administration have been undermined by entrenched corruption and lack of human capital.
4. Geography — and external constraints — will also be a factor
Liberal economic reforms to foster private-sector development and diversify the economy seem unlikely for one big reason: Azerbaijan shares a land border with Russia. Russia’s moves in Georgia and Ukraine have demonstrated President Vladimir Putin’s resolve in stopping pro-Western shifts among neighbors, such as tightening links to the E.U. and opening markets for Western investment.
Azerbaijan’s ruling family seems keenly aware of this pattern and probably aims to keep Russia at ease. President Aliyev’s statement in a November 2019 speech that Azerbaijan will not seek closer integration with Europe was perhaps a signal along those lines to Russia. Around the same time, First Vice President Aliyeva paid an official visit to Moscow. In a rare move, Putin not only met the vice president but also presented her with a Russian state award.
Don’t expect fresh ideas in the new parliament
Azerbaijan’s new parliament will probably be dominated by handpicked regime loyalists, with young faces few and far between, in the government’s efforts to appeal more to foreign investors.
While it is tempting to link the call for a snap election to the government’s promises, there is yet no indication that genuine economic reform is underway. It remains to be seen whether the young, Western-educated cadres Aliyev appointed to key positions last fall have the power and capacity to implement market-oriented overhauls. Moreover, any changes are likely to meet resistance from the old guard and oligarchs, who seek to protect wealth they amassed during the recent oil boom.
Geography also matters; being surrounded by a great power like Russia remains a major obstacle to any structural economic reform.
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Farid Guliyev is a postdoctoral fellow at Justus Liebig University Giessen in Germany.
Anar K. Ahmadov is an assistant professor in the Netherlands at Leiden University’s Faculty of Governance and Global Affairs.