This rambling post begins with John Judis:
bq. The Tea Parties are the descendants of a number of conservative insurgencies from the past two generations: the anti-tax rebellion of the late ’70s, the Moral Majority and Christian Coalition of the ’80s and ’90s, and Pat Buchanan’s presidential runs. Like the Tea Partiers I saw in Washington—and the picture of the Tea Partiers put forward by the Winston and Quinnipiac polls—these movements have been almost entirely white, disproportionately middle-aged or older, and more male than female (though parts of the Christian right are an exception on this count). A majority of their adherents generally are not college-educated, with incomes in the middle range—attributes that also closely match the Tea Party movement’s demographic profile. (A misleading picture of Tea Partiers as college-educated and affluent came from a New York Times/CBS poll of people who merely “support,” but don’t necessarily have anything to do with, the Tea Party movement. The other polls surveyed people who say they are “part of” the movement.)
This is wrong in a couple respects, I think. First, Judis ignores other data that suggests that Tea Party activists are indeed college-educated and affluent. The Political/Target Point exit poll of activists at the Washington DC Tax Day rally, found that 69% had either a college degree or some postgraduate study (pdf). Nearly a third (34%) made $100,000 or more each year, and 28% made $60-100,000.
A CNN poll that tried to identify the real activists as opposed to the “supporters” found the same thing. Jennifer Agiesta rounded up the results of both of these polls a month ago.
The P/TP poll also shows an enormous difference between the Tea Party and the Christian Right movements of the 1980s and 1990s. Judis thinks that Tea Partiers are conventional conservatives, with social views to match:
bq. Likewise, the Tea Partiers have been moved to action by economic issues, but they share the outlook of social conservatives.
The P/TP poll found that there were significant fissures within their sample of activists:
bq. Overwhelming majorities of 88% and 81% say government is trying to do too many things best left to individuals and businesses, and that government should cut taxes and spending, respectively. But in terms of values, Tea Party attendees are split right down the middle. A slim majority of 51% say “Government should not promote any particular set of values”, versus 46% that say “Government should promote traditional family values in our society.”
My point is not that the P/TP and CNN polls are the final word. But if we are trying to characterize a movement, the views and demographics of those who are actually _taking action_ are just as important, if not more so, as those who “support” it. After all, movements aren’t going to be built by people giving casual responses to pollsters.
Both Judis (as well as Mark Lilla) link the Tea Party to the American intellectual tradition and to past movements. There have been other such analyses, and they’re useful. But we can’t predict much about what the Tea Party will accomplish by tracing its origins to the Puritans or whatever. The Tea Party’s success hinges on more mundane things: does it have an _organization_ that will outlast this political moment? Judis notes, as have others, that its organization is diffuse:
bq. Like many American movements, the Tea Parties are not tightly organized from above. They are a network of local groups and national ones (Tea Party Patriots, Tea Party Express, Tea Party Nation), Washington lobbies and quasi-think tanks (FreedomWorks, Americans for Prosperity), bloggers, and talk-show hosts.
So, we’ve got a movement with fissures among the activists on important issues and no real overarching organization or leadership (other than, according to Judis, Glenn Beck). I will be more convinced about the longevity of the Tea Party when I am confident that its leaders will be able to coordinate their efforts and do the grassroots mobilization that will be less visible on cable news but more potent. (Marc Ambinder also makes this point.) Moreover, most analyses tend to consider the Tea Party in isolation, as if there aren’t other movements or large institutions in politics that, you know, have some power and oppose the Tea Party in some respects. Unlike Matt Bai, I am not prepared to write off party organizations. Nor am I prepared to write off the organization that Obama will pull together for 2012.
Let me note two other challenges that the Tea Party faces.
The issues that Tea Party activists do agree on — economic issues — are not issues on which the majority of the public shares their views. Sure, people say they’re concerned about the size of government and the deficit, but the public likes many government programs too. My earlier post on conflicted conservatives is one illustration. This Washington Post story is another.
Finally, I think people see the Tea Party protests and think that something _ideological_ is afoot in the broader American public. It’s not. Judis makes this point:
bq. And their [the Tea Party’s] core appeal on government and spending will continue to resonate as long as the economy sputters.
If the appeal is ideological, then who cares what the economy does? A growing economy isn’t going to shrink the size of government. If people are ideologues, the state of the economy shouldn’t matter.
But they’re not ideologues. A mountain of political science establishes this. This political moment is not about ideology, it is about _performance_. People want conditions in the country to improve. They want a growing economy. Once that happens, people’s assessments of the government’s performance will also improve. Obama’s approval will go up. Trust in government will go up. Approval of Congress will go up. This won’t necessarily derail the activists at the Tea Party’s core, but it will be hard to see their ire reflected in the broader public.