Taiwan’s citizens will go to the polls on Saturday to elect their next president and members of parliament. It is widely expected that Tsai Ing-wen, chair and presidential nominee of the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), is likely to win the presidency.
Tsai vows that she will maintain the status quo with China. But she has made it clear that she will not endorse the “1992 consensus.” That’s the tacit understanding that there is “one China,” without specifying precisely what that means.
If Tsai wins the 2016 elections, it will be mind-boggling for Chinese leaders. The Beijing government has treated Taiwan as a renegade province, which it has vowed to unify the island “with the motherland,” with military force if necessary. But after Taiwan’s 1996 and 2000 presidential elections, Beijing realized that saber-rattling could only backfire. In both cases, candidates who Chinese leaders disapproved won the election as Beijing’s action only hardened the island citizens’ resistance.
Chinese leaders have since based their Taiwan policy mainly on economic exchanges, hoping that would lead to political integration. Outgoing President Ma Ying-jeou, who took office in 2008, encouraged those economic ties and endorsed the “1992 consensus.”
More than 20 agreements were reached by Taipei and Beijing during Ma’s presidency, including a landmark trade deal, in which the Chinese government made significant economic concessions. China is now Taiwan’s largest trading partner and the top destination of Taiwanese investment. Many business people routinely shuttle between the island and the Chinese mainland, while more than 3 million Chinese tourists visited Taiwan in 2014.
But Beijing’s expectation that economic exchange would lead to political integration has been disappointed. The increased ties have alarmed many Taiwan citizens. Surveys by the Election Study Center (ESC) of the National Chengchi University in Taiwan show that between 44 and 56 percent of respondents supported expanding economic activities with China between 2004 and 2008 — but that support dropped to between 37 and 42 percent between 2011 and 2015.
What’s more, opposition to expanding economic ties grew much stronger during the same period, as between 28 and 43 percent of Taiwan’s citizens demanded that the government decrease those economic links.
Taiwan citizens’ views on economic exchanges between Taiwan and China
Data: Taiwan National Security Survey, multiple waves
Since September 2012, most of Taiwan’s citizens have been dissatisfied with Taipei’s approach toward China, the signature policy of the Ma administration. Public disapproval reached 60 percent in 2014, culminating in a massive protest known as the Sunflower Movement.
Taiwan citizens’ views on President Ma’s cross-strait policy
Data: Taiwan’s Election and Democratization Study (TEDS). Telephone interview on presidential satisfaction, multiple waves.
Why has there been such a backlash against Ma’s engagement toward China? Although tension between two sides of the Taiwan Strait has eased since Ma took office in 2008, Chinese leaders have repeatedly shown their unyielding opposition to Taiwanese sovereignty.
For instance, Beijing recently and unilaterally announced a new air route and new travel document for China-bound Taiwan travelers. The former was seen as infringing on Taiwan’s air space; the latter was considered as an attempt to “Hong Kong-ize” the island, creating an impression that Taiwan is part of China.
Indeed, Beijing has persistently enforced its version of “one China” internationally, isolating Taiwan diplomatically as a result. Taipei currently has official relationships with only 22 countries and retains membership in just a handful of international governmental organizations. To be involved in global activities, Taipei frequently has to go through contentious negotiations and must compromise on its name, flag, and national anthem in order to meet Beijing’s demands that it be seen as a part of China.
Consider, for example, involvement in international sports. One ESC focus group participant complained, “Why can’t [our athletes] carry our national flag in the game [like athletes of other countries]? China is isolating us.” Another participant stated that Beijing “is constantly bullying us and isolating us … How do I feel about this? I hate its guts [hen-zhi-ru-gu].”
For these reasons and many more, a large proportion of the island citizens have consistently seen Beijing as a hostile regime, despite increasing economic ties.
Taiwan citizens’ views on Beijing’s hostility, 2007 -2014
Data: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University
And so the prospect of still more economic integration worries Taiwan’s citizens, who fear that economic dependence will make the island more vulnerable to China’s control. Beijing’s economic concessions, despite being quite generous, are viewed as a way to annex Taiwan. Tsai has taken advantage of the public’s anxiety over Ma’s engagement policy to consolidate her party’s electoral support.
[Here’s what you need to know about Taiwan’s upcoming elections]
Taiwan leaves a four-month gap between the Jan. 16 elections and the May 20 inauguration. If Tsai is elected, Chinese leaders will be watching her post-election statements, inaugural speech, and other public behavior to see that she will abide by the “1992 consensus.”
But the Beijing government needs to consider that its unyielding stand on Taiwan’s sovereignty, its diplomatic isolation of Taipei, and its military threats are bringing voters toward Tsai and her party.
T.Y. Wang is professor of political science at Illinois State University. He is the co-editor of Journal of Asian and African Studies, and was the coordinator of the Conference Group of Taiwan Studies (CGOTS) of the American Political Science Association.