A man casts his ballot on the second day of elections in north Khartoum, April 14, 2015. (Mohamed Nureldin Abdallah/Reuters)
The minimal criterion of credibility for Sudan’s ongoing ‘elections’ is whether it would pass the ‘Nigerian test’: what would happen in case of major upset where an opposition candidate wins, as has just happened in Nigeria earlier this month? The result would be a cataclysmic revolution, to put it mildly.
President Omar Hassan Ahmed Al-Bashir, who came to power in a military coup in 1989, is wanted for crimes by the International Criminal Court (ICC). His numerous internal opponents are even less forgiving. It would thus be unwise for him to preside over a process that could leave his fate in the hands of his sworn enemies. The president, who has survived wars, famine and international hostility, has many faults. But he is not that naïve. So free elections are out of the question. This vote, like every other since 1996, could have only one outcome: his return to power.
So why these sham elections in the first place? The majority of political forces, including a few that were practically regime allies, do not recognize them; nor does the international community. In fact the opposition has begged Bashir to postpone the elections, pending the outcome of a ‘national dialogue’ he himself called in January 2014. The initiative was almost universally welcomed internally and internationally. Bashir could stay in power, all agreed, while the dialogue is being conducted.
Germany went further, organizing last February a meeting for opposition leaders and civil society activists in Berlin, who agreed on steps to advance the dialogue. A preparatory meeting was scheduled in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, at the end of March. But the government boycotted that meeting over procedural disagreements, including over elections timing.
The ruling party insisted that delaying could create a constitutional vacuum. The regime rarely respected the internationally crafted constitution. Moreover, only a few months back, its rubber-stamp parliament passed sweeping amendments, taking away the right to elect state governors, and giving the president sweeping new powers. The unconstitutional conduct of the security services, including the arresting of suspects or interfering with freedom of expression, were also legitimized. So why not postpone the elections to help the national dialogue? And how can credible elections be expected in this atmosphere?
(Genuine) elections would be a great risk in any case, given Sudan’s fragmented politics, multiple civil wars and myriad tribal disputes. Contentious issues — including what to do with the president if he loses — need to be settled through dialogue. Some progress has been made over the last year under the stewardship of former South African president Thabo Mbeki, the African Union’s point man for Sudan. Following a series of agreements among opposition groups, and deals with the government, a ‘road map’ for conducting the dialogue was agreed. All that remained was to sit down at the table and tackle the pressing issues to avoid the threat of economic and political collapse. For, in spite of promised support from Sudan’s newly found Gulf, the economy is in dire straits.
Instead, the regime insisted on holding pointless, costly and minimally contested elections. Only a few allies of the ruling National Congress party (NCP) are contesting the elections, but they do not pose a threat to the party’s dominance. There are a few hotly contested seats due to local rivalry, while the participation for the first time of a major faction of the DUP (formerly the second largest party in parliament) may ensure the presence of non-NCP parliamentarians for the first time. Other than that, the elections remain inconsequential.
The regime is hoping for a large turnout to make this into a referendum. It has mobilized all its resources to achieve this. After a second day of voting, however, the visible results do not look reassuring. They have no need to worry, since the regime has ample expertise in ballot box stuffing. But this will be a rare instance where a regime could have had more legitimacy before winning the elections than after it.
Abdelwahab El-Affendi is Reader in Politics at the University of Westminster, London.
