As Syrian refugees are pouring into countries all over Europe, how will governments reduce citizens’ prejudice, which can fester and erupt into problems? Some answers have emerged from a study that we recently authored in Political Science Research & Methods.
Ours is the first-ever experimental trial to examine how to reduce individual prejudice against Syrian refugees. We conducted our study — an experiment embedded in a survey — in 2013 in Turkey, then home to more than 500,000 Syrian refugees and which now hosts almost 2 million refugees.
At the time, prejudice among Turks toward Syrian refugees was high: A nationally representative poll found that 86 percent of Turks opposed the further refugee entry and 30 percent wanted the refugees to be deported to Syria.
To counter prejudice in this setting, we tested a theory from political psychology that goes like this: When you emphasize an identity that’s shared by members of two otherwise antagonistic groups, you can reduce prejudice. While the theory has been tested on such identities as nationality and university affiliation, no one had yet tested whether emphasizing shared religious identities would reduce prejudice. And so we did.
That wasn’t the only reason we tested religious identity. The other reason: That was precisely the tactic that then-Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan was using to diminish Turkish opposition to his open-door policy for Syrians: invoking shared religious bonds. No one could be sure how that emphasis would work. Would secular Turks be irked by appeals based on religion?
We noticed that Turkish public discourse contained appeals to two religious identities — Islam and Sunni Islam — that were in fact shared by the vast majority of Turks and Syrian refugees. Our study examined both appeals since they may work differently: One emphasizes a shared sectarian identity while the other does not.
At the same time, we investigated a second question. Even if shared religious identity could reduce prejudice in the abstract, could it do so in the face of other powerful factors on the opposing side—and in particular, the costs of integrating the foreign group? The news media had documented widespread concerns among Turks about how much taking in those refugees would cost the country economically. Many locals complained both about high levels of government spending on the refugees, and also about how all those refugees in towns bordering Syria were bringing down wages while pushing up rents.
To examine how these two opposing dynamics might affect prejudice, we designed a survey experiment. Some respondents randomly assigned to hear statements that emphasized one shared religious identity (Sunni or Muslim). Other respondents also heard one of these references while also being told how much refugees were costing Turkey. We surveyed almost 1,200 Turkish men in Istanbul and Gaziantep, which borders Syria and hosts a significant refugee population.
Respondents randomly assigned to the control group were simply asked to answer questions about “Syrian refugees in Turkey.” Respondents in the first treatment group were asked to answer questions about “… Syrian refugees in Turkey, most of whom are Sunni,” reminding them about their common Sunni religious identity. Respondents in the second treatment group were primed on a common Muslim religious identity (“… Syrian refugees in Turkey, most of whom are Muslim”). To vary economic information, some respondents were read a statement (“The Turkish government has spent almost 3 billion Turkish lira providing food, shelter, and other humanitarian support to these refugees”) while others were not read this statement.
We created six experimental groups to examine all possible combinations of religious primes and economic information, including a pure control group, which heard neither the religious references nor the economic information.
We then measured how these experimental manipulations affected attitudes and behaviors when they answered our survey questions. We asked for opinions on allowing refugees to stay in Turkey; on governmental spending to support refugees; on how much they trusted refugees; and on allowing refugees to work in their own neighborhood.
To measure whether these references actually changed respondents’ behavior, each one was asked if he would like to donate any portion of his survey compensation (4 Turkish lira, the equivalent of US$2 at the time) to a charity supporting Syrian refugees.
Lastly, we built a general index of prejudice based on all five indicators. You can see the results in the figure below.
Our study shows that subtle reminders about a shared identity can modestly reduce prejudice, both in attitudes and behavior.
Reminding Turks that they most Turks and Syrians are Sunni increased support for the refugees overall — the general index of prejudice for this treatment group was statistically different from the control group. Being reminded of a shared Muslim identity only increased donations, with this group donating on average $0.30 more than the control group.
But even that modest improvement in attitudes and behavior — caused by both the Sunni and the Muslim emphases — disappeared when we reminded people of the cost of taking in the refugees.
Here are the takeaways for officials who want to manage their citizens’ prejudice toward Syrian refugees:
First, some religious primes are better suited for attitude change; others are more effective in changing behavior. Future research should investigate if such patterns also exist elsewhere, such as among Muslim communities within E.U. countries or within other Muslim-majority countries.
Second, we found that using religion to build tolerance has its limit, especially when individuals are reminded of how much taking in refugees costs. Officials shouldn’t assume that religious solidarity will heal all wounds; rather, they should clarify how they will pay for the humanitarian effort and dispel economic worries.
Third, for countries that aren’t Muslim-majority, tolerance toward Syrian refugees may be facilitated by references to other shared identities that can overcome the “us” vs. “them” mentality. Many Europeans, for instance, could be reminded of their historical identities as migrants or as persecuted individuals during times of war.
Egor Lazarev is a PhD candidate at the department of political science at Columbia University, working on a dissertation on how Russian law co-exists with shari’a and customary law in Chechnya. Kunaal Sharma is a PhD candidate in the same department, working on a dissertation on how to persuade Sunni and Shiite youths in India to become more tolerant toward one another.