About two months ago, I posed a question about the ethics of social science research on torture. The post led to quite a lot of discussion both “here on The Monkey Cage”:https://themonkeycage.org/2009/05/social_science_torture_and_eth.html as well as elsewhere “in the blogosphere”:http://aroundthesphere.wordpress.com/2009/05/12/people-for-the-ethical-treatment-of-data/ (including discussion by “Daniel Drezner”:http://drezner.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2009/05/11/a_torturous_question_about_social_science at _Foreign Policy_ and “Andrew Sullivan”:http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/05/researching-torture.html and “Megan McArdle”:http://meganmcardle.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/05/the_society_for_ethical_data.php at _The Atlantic_).
In the aftermath of the post, “John Schiemann”:http://view.fdu.edu/default.aspx?id=6308 got in touch with me about a paper he had recently written entitled Interrogational Torture: Or How Good Guys Get Bad Information with Ugly Methods that is closely related to the topic. To be clear, he has _not_ written the type of paper I discussed in the previous post, e.g., a paper that conducts on empirical test on the efficacy of torture. Instead, he has attempted to use tools of social science to get at this question in a different way. Here’s the full text of the email John sent me:
bq. As someone who is working on the effectiveness of interrogational torture, I’d like to weigh in. My paper (abstracts and links for downloading at the end of this post) argues that we don’t – and won’t – have good data and so models interrogational torture as a game of incomplete (imperfect) information. The upshot of the paper is that it doesn’t work and even the pragmatists should agree we shouldn’t use it. Because it’s purely theoretical, I suppose it’s more easily dismissed, especially outside academia, but as I began the project I still struggled with the dilemmas identified in Josh’s original question.
bq. I was motivated to investigate the effectiveness question because my government was torturing (and perhaps will torture under Obama if deemed necessary, given the current administration’s defense of Bush-era policies on Bagram) based on the claim it was effective. Although I accept the deontological argument against torture I also had the sense was that interrogational torture just wasn’t very effective. I’m also convinced the ticking bomb scenario is a “fantasy”:http://www.amazon.com/Torture-Ticking-Blackwell-Public-Philosophy/dp/1405162023/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&s=books&qid=1246462092&sr=1-1, so I didn’t buy the Jack Bauer/24 argument either. In short, I thought what the government was doing in my name was morally abhorrent and I thought I might have something to say which might change some of the pro-torture minds. In fact, it appeared immoral to me to stay silent while the U.S. continued to torture based on the effectiveness claim if I believed torture was ineffective and could demonstrate it. It would be immoral not just because detainees were being tortured but also because ineffective interrogational torture wastes time and resources better spent on “techniques that actually generate valuable information”:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/04/23/opinion/23soufan.html?_r=1&emc=eta1. So, even if your moral circle includes only innocent civilians who are potential victims of terrorism and not detainees, ineffective interrogational torture is wrong. In short, I think such questions need to be pursued. Unless we’re willing to reinforce public perceptions of the utter irrelevance of the ivory tower, we have to take up the hard questions. Saying no means avoiding the problems that actually matter.
bq. But I struggled with the question of what I would do if my model showed it was effective. (I’m not a good enough game theorist to have had a very clear picture in advance of what equilibria would result from the game I set-up.) Of course, given the very nature of a game theoretic model, the most that will be said is that torture is effective given certain assumptions and under such and such circumstances, conditions, and restrictions. Still, I worried this could provide support for torture.
bq. I decided to go ahead and try to publish even if the results came out the ‘wrong’ way. (In the end, I didn’t face this choice because my results are fairly strong against its effectiveness.) First, I agree with Eronarn that publishing only those results consistent with your normative preferences entails a “massive loss of integrity.” Why should anyone believe any findings by academics if this is common practice? Nor do I accept William Ockham’s analogy between interrogational torture and the rape of children to see the effects on behavior. I don’t agree with the utilitarian argument for interrogational torture – indeed, I’m swayed by both utilitarian and deontological arguments against interrogational torture – but I don’t think that the pro argument can be simply dismissed out of hand. It needs to be countered. (JT note: Eronarn and William Ockham provided comments on the “original post”:https://themonkeycage.org/2009/05/social_science_torture_and_eth.html.)
bq. But an outcome showing torture is effective should be published for reasons beyond a commitment to the abstract (but important!) principles of scientific inquiry. First, the U.S. and other governments were/are already torturing; supportive results will at most add only more rhetorical support; they won’t initiate new torture. Second, any support will be qualified by the conditions supporting the effective results: conditions which may never obtain in the real world and so effectively showing that torture doesn’t really work (i.e. in the real world). But even if torture does prove to be effective in ways translatable to the real world, don’t we want to know that?
bq. I say that we would want to know that for two reasons. First, although I believe that Brecher shows the ticking time bomb scenario to be a “fantasy” the fact is that others –including those with the power to use torture – buy it. That means that torture will be used by the state interrogators in such situations whether a liberal college professor like me wants them to or not. The only question is whether they will be effective and minimize the so-called ‘necessary’ torture. There is little prospect of either right now. Second, the very restrictive conditions identified in the model can be used to place restraints on the way interrogational torture is actually practiced, as opposed to the shadowy, unrestrained practices at present. I recognize that here is where some would charge me with complicity. But the fact is, there is some amount (instances, degree of severity) of torture out there without publishing such results. Publishing the results won’t increase it and may in fact reduce that amount and any reduction in torture is a good thing. Concretely this would mean that someone who would have been tortured might not be. How would you explain to this person that you declined to publish a result that would have reduced the pain caused to him/her because you felt you might be complicit in the practice of torture?
bq. So even in a worst case scenario in which torture is shown to be effective under some limited circumstances, we would want to know that. What is the alternative? The alternative is to do nothing and help preserve a status quo in which torture is unrestrained. As difficult as it would be to swallow a result showing some limited effectiveness of torture, I’d rather live with that than what the U.S. has been doing – and perhaps is continuing to do.
Abstract of _Interrogational Torture: Or How Good Guys Get Bad Information with Ugly Methods_: The use of “enhanced interrogation” techniques by the United States remains a matter of public debate. Recent revelations have revived the question as to whether harsh interrogation techniques amounting to torture such as waterboarding are an effective form of intelligence gathering. Answering this question is a necessary – if not necessarily sufficient – condition for the pragmatic justification of interrogational torture. Given the difficulty of approaching the question of effectiveness empirically, I address it theoretically, asking whether torture meets reasonable normative conditions of reliability, predictability, frequency, and intensity of torture. I find that although interrogational torture is neither reliable nor predictable it is likely to be used frequently and harshly once it is admitted as an interrogation technique.
The full paper can be downloaded here.
The appendices can be downloaded here.