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The Defeat of the Clinton Health Care Plan and the 1994 Elections

- August 26, 2009

Did the Clinton health care plan affect the outcome of the 1994 elections? A few weeks ago, I suggested that it didn’t, and that a much more important indicator was dissatisfaction with the economy, combined with some local factors.

Today, James Morone suggests that the defeat of health care reform did affect the 1994 elections by “demoralizing” Democrats:

bq. Many Democrats are moving to whittle back health reform in order to win over moderate, fence-sitting, frightened independents. Big mistake.

bq. Go back and look at the midterm tsunami that swept the Democrats out of office the last time. The turnout for that wave was just 36 percent. Moderate, fence sitting independents don’t vote in midterm elections with a 36 percent turn out.

bq. What really happened back in 1994? The Republican base – jubilant, mobilized, and angry – turned out. The Democratic base – dispirited, disenchanted, and demobilized – stayed home. As Democrats ponder which way to go in this latest round they ought to read the political lessons more carefully: Short term electoral success rests with the base, the people who got excited about “change we can believe in.” Long term electoral success rests in designing and pushing through a program that then grows very popular.

Ezra Klein cites this approvingly:

bq. The political danger is not just that a failure on health-care reform will anger the electorate. It will also change the composition of the electorate. Dispirited Democrats will stay home. Energized Republicans will press their advantage. Add in that the wave of young voters who were energized by Obama’s campaign probably aren’t going to turn out for the midterm election anyway, and you’re looking at a pretty unfriendly landscape.

bq. That’s why the midterms are dangerous for Democrats. Losing on health care and collapsing into recriminations and internal divisions pretty much guarantees that Democratic voters of all sorts are turned off. You don’t just win elections by being popular. You win elections by making sure that the people who like you turn out to vote.

What does the data tell us about turnout in 1994? Here is a graph of self-reported turnout based on ANES data:

midtermturnout.png

Unsurprisingly, Republicans have historically maintained an edge in turnout, with the exception of 1982-1990. In 1994, turnout among _both_ parties was up, relative to 1990. It was up more among Republicans (a 14-point increase) than among Democrats (a 5-point increase).

To me, this is pretty mixed evidence that 1994 was due to a “demobilized” or “dispirited” set of Democrats. It does appear that Republicans were energized, but it looks like Democrats were too, just less so. Moreover, if you estimate a model of turnout that controls for ethnicity and education, there is no significant relationship between party and turnout in 1994. Any difference between the parties appears spurious.

What about other measures of “spirit”? The ANES asks “Some people don’t pay much attention to political campaigns. How about you, would you say that you have been/were very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in the political campaigns (so far) this year?” In 1994, there is an apparent gap between the parties: 34% of Republicans said “very interested” compared to 25% of Democrats. But again, the difference between the parties is negligible once you control for education and income: a shift from “strong Democrat” to “strong Republican” is associated with only a 4% increase in political interest.

In short, there is little evidence that Democrats were “dispirited” in 1994, much less by the failure of health care reform. Of course it’s good for Obama if health care reform passes, but we shouldn’t assume that its passage (or failure) will actually affect the 2010 election.