Congress. Looks better than it works. (Photo credit: AP Photo, J. Scott Applewhite)
Congress has cleared the Continuing Resolution (aka the “CR”), a stopgap funding bill to keep the federal government running through Dec. 11. In contrast to last fall’s government shutdown drama, passage was relatively smooth sailing– even with funding attached to train and equip the opposition in the Syrian civil war.
Still, Congress will again have to tackle how to fund the government when the CR expires in early December. That decision will likely hinge in part on the outcome of the November elections. Democrats, regardless of party control of the Senate, will likely push for an “omnibus” spending bill that wraps all 12 spending bills into a single package. In theory, this could be a relatively easy lift given that the House already passed seven of the bills and the Senate Appropriations panel secured bipartisan support for several as well. And with the midterm elections behind them, Republicans might be willing to drop controversial amendments that spurred disagreement this past spring and summer about voting rules for otherwise non-controversial appropriations bills. However, Republicans (particularly if the elections hand them control of the Senate come January) could instead throw their weight behind passage of another short-term CR (kicking the can until winter when they take control of the Senate) or a longer CR to fund the remainder of the fiscal year (through September 2015).
Despite the lack of drama this week, these choices about how to fund the government (as nap-inducing as they might be on a Friday afternoon) and their potential consequences for Congress merit some attention.
First, federal agencies and executive branch departments typically prefer appropriations bills to CRs. Stopgap spending bills freeze the bureaucracy into the previous year’s spending decisions, preventing bureaucrats from addressing new problems, revamping old programs or planning for the new fiscal year. Of course, bureaucratic efficiency hardly motivates Congress to avoid CRs. Based on Congressional Research Service data, the figure below shows the frequency with which Congress has defaulted to CRs when spending bills prove out of reach. There are several outlier years (1996, 2001, and 2011), and there are no clear patterns: Congress doesn’t resort more often to CRs in recent years, in periods of divided government, or before an election. Stop gaps are instead a perennial crutch for lawmakers.
Second, as pathetic as a full-year continuing resolution might sound, there is ample precedent for such a move. As the figure below suggests (also based on the CRS data), Congress has largely (but not entirely) managed to avoid full-year CRs in recent years, but they were used frequently in the contentious years of 1980s budgets, when President Reagan squared off against congressional Democrats in increasingly partisan and fiscally tight times. That said, some full year CRs reach farther than others. Only in three fiscal years since 1977 has Congress wrapped every single discretionary spending bill into a full-year CR. If Senate Republicans insist on offering amendments to individual spending bills or an omnibus spending bill come December, a full-year CR wrapping up all 12 spending bills remains a possibility– even though Congress agreed on a top-line spending total back in January and several spending bills secured bipartisan consensus during the Senate’s committee markups.
Third, we typically think about the adverse consequences of stopgap spending bills on bureaucrats and the executive branch. But failure to write and pass individual appropriations bills also gnaws away at Congress’s legislative capacity and lawmakers’ influence.
- Congress as an institution cedes some of its power of the purse to the executive by giving up the opportunity to scrutinize executive branch and independent agency priorities. CRs freeze past decisions, precluding efforts by lawmakers to redirect bureaucrats and the programs they administer.
- Lawmakers who do not serve on the House or Senate appropriations panels cede power to appropriators. If the chambers do not consider individual bills on the floor, only appropriators have the opportunity to move federal priorities– given that the size and timing of omnibus spending bills often preclude floor amendments. Moreover, broader participation in crafting spending bills on the floor potentially widens support among non-committee members for committee bills, even if their amendments fail.
- Rank-and-file lawmakers give up power to committee and party leaders, whose staff typically manage negotiations over omnibus bills and CRs.
- Appropriations committee leaders cede power to party leaders, given party leaders’ dominant role in both chambers when deadlines loom for must-pass bills.
- The Senate potentially loses power to the House, given that the House has been able to pass several spending bills in recent years when partisan disagreements have derailed the bills on their way to the Senate floor. In theory at least, chamber floor votes give some weight to House appropriators when they sit down to negotiate final spending bills with their Senate counterparts.
Neither CRs nor omnibus bills are great ways to legislate. Contemporary politics may demand their use, but lawmakers and their institution surely pay a price for regularly ceding some or all of their power of the purse to bureaucrats. CRs give undue weight to past decisions, even as present conditions change. Omnibus bills may be an improvement over CRs. But even those legislative vehicles undermine congressional capacity, of late in short supply.