Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe abruptly announced his resignation on Aug. 28, citing health concerns. The longest-serving prime minister in Japanese history, Abe presided over a period of impressive political stability, with decisive victories in lower-house elections in 2012, 2014 and 2017.
What legacy can we expect, following Abe’s ambitious agenda at home and abroad? His namesake “Abenomics” reforms sought to reinvigorate Japan’s economy through bold monetary and fiscal policy, while pursuing structural changes to areas like agriculture, corporate governance, energy, labor markets and women’s employment.
Abe also championed proactive leadership for Japan in the world, making significant changes to security policy and stepping up support for the liberal international order as traditional defenders such as the United States and the United Kingdom retreated. In a forthcoming volume, Takeo Hoshi and I argue that Abe took advantage of institutional changes in Japanese politics, establishing a new model of governance that his successors are likely to emulate.
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Abe’s predecessors struggled to govern Japan
Japan’s political institutions underwent significant transitions over the past three decades. In 1994, lower-house electoral reform changed the incentives of Japanese politicians, placing greater emphasis on broad appeals to the median voter rather than the traditional focus on pork-barrel politics. Administrative reforms starting in 1998 shifted power from the bureaucracy to politicians. The staff of the Cabinet Secretariat expanded threefold over the past 20 years, giving the prime minister greater independent capacity to formulate policy.
Until 2012, Japanese leaders struggled to exercise effective leadership under Japan’s new political institutions. Electoral reform in the lower house was not mirrored in the upper house, which made it difficult for parties to control both houses of the Diet, or parliament, while maintaining internal coherence. Governments of both Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) were hampered alternatively by internecine struggles and divided government.
When Abe assumed power, Japan had seen a revolving door of six prime ministers lasting only about a year each — including Abe himself in 2006-2007. The only recent prime minister to achieve longevity was Koizumi Junichiro, but his approach — which relied on personal charisma and an orchestrated assault against his own party — was not replicable.
Abe came to power with a model to lead Japan
Abe sought to overcome these problems with three main strategies. First, he strove to maintain strong public support by pivoting to themes of Abenomics reform whenever his popularity waned, such as after passing controversial security legislation. His media strategy looked to shape popular narratives by limiting and controlling access to the prime minister, managing scandals quickly with an eye to the news cycle and pressuring critical news outlets.
Second, Abe used elections as a mechanism to quell internal dissent and impose party discipline. The 2014 election set the tone, as Abe overcame opponents of a consumption-tax-hike postponement within the LDP and the Ministry of Finance by calling an election and scoring a public mandate. His robust public support, which averaged close to 50 percent, made the threat of snap elections credible.
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Third, Abe built on previous reforms by concentrating greater authority in the Cabinet Office and expanding control over personnel decisions in the bureaucracy. He also implemented a variety of practical measures to improve coordination and public messaging, such as the participation of his key lieutenants on the Diet Affairs Committee to coordinate legislative strategies.
On some goals, Abe came up short
Abe was unable to achieve his lifelong ambition of amending the Japanese constitution, despite requisite Diet supermajorities. This effort was stymied by lukewarm public support and the reluctance of Komeito, his coalition partner. Despite considerable efforts, he could not resolve the North Korean abduction of Japanese nationals or conclude a peace treaty with Russia. He sought to resolve the World War II-era “comfort women” issue “finally and irreversibly,” but it globalized, and relations with South Korea continued to deteriorate.
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There were also important areas of omission. Despite shifting Japanese public opinion on social issues like same-sex marriage, dual citizenship and allowing married couples to use separate surnames, the Abe government resisted change. Abe’s policies on climate change were unambitious despite his green rhetoric. Journalists and the United Nations criticized Abe’s media strategy for compromising press freedom.
Abe also benefited from good fortune, such as the absence of major crises. A weak and divided opposition in an electoral system emphasizing single-member districts gave him a substantial structural advantage. His landslide victories came despite lukewarm public support for the LDP’s policy platform.
Abe’s coronavirus leadership got low marks from citizens
Abe’s response to the coronavirus pandemic presents an interesting conundrum. Japan’s initial response came relatively early. The government presciently emphasized high-risk situations, contact tracing and the use of masks early on, while the World Health Organization and Western authorities were providing conflicting advice. Japan avoided a full lockdown and recorded relatively few official cases and deaths — though such data should be interpreted with caution. Despite this, Japanese citizens gave Abe low marks for pandemic leadership, and his approval ratings fell to the lowest levels of his tenure in August.
What happened? The pandemic presented a perfect storm for Abe’s governance model. As his approval ratings slipped, Abe followed his standard playbook by pivoting to Abenomics growth themes. However, stimulus measures such as incentives for domestic travel proved counterproductive in the context of a contagious disease.
And Abe’s tight media strategy may have harmed his public standing by limiting direct communication to Japanese citizens during the crisis. Although Abe exercised strong authority over the central government, local governments in Japan retain considerable autonomy. The coronavirus put local governments at the front lines of response in areas like business closures and testing, giving political rivals a platform to criticize him.
Abe’s successors face the nontrivial task of heeding lessons, listening to critics, and improving on his model. The end of Abe’s rule may prompt debates about institutional rebalancing, such as strengthening the authority of Japan’s traditionally weak courts. Nonetheless, Abe will be remembered not only for his policies, but also for ushering in a new era in Japanese politics.
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Phillip Y. Lipscy is associate professor in the department of political science and Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the University of Toronto, where he also directs the Centre for the Study of Global Japan. He is co-editor with Takeo Hoshi of “The Political Economy of the Abe Government and Abenomics Reforms” (Cambridge University Press, forthcoming).