Former president Donald Trump’s aides want to overhaul the federal civil service, should Trump have a second term in the Oval Office, according to reporting. The goal: Give the president more discretion in hiring and firing federal employees, instead of evaluating them strictly on merit-based standards originally designed to reduce political patronage and protect workers from shifting political winds.
In October 2020, Trump briefly put into place a similar plan — called “Schedule F” — via Executive Order 13597, which President Biden rescinded in January 2021. Last month, Rep. Chip Roy (R-Tex.) introduced a bill to fulfill Trump’s aim, making civil servants “at will” employees, with the goal of getting the government to operate more like a private business. Democrats railed against Schedule F when it was introduced and oppose its revival, arguing that civil servants deserve legal buffers from politicians.
Which is better — a civil service protected from politics by strict merit-based standards, or a civil service that answers only to the president? When social scientists research this question, they find that meritocratic government bureaucracies help protect against corruption, deliver economic results for their nations, and contribute to democratic stability.
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What is a politicized bureaucracy?
Scholars distinguish between two basic types of bureaucracies. In one system, codified rules define an official’s duties, subjecting those officials to rules and regulations that discourage and punish bribes and corruption. People are usually hired and fired according to merit, as defined by technical qualifications. They enjoy stable career paths, regardless of their individual political beliefs. The German sociologist Max Weber called these systems “rational-legal” bureaucracies. The United States moved in this direction with the Pendleton Act in 1883, which ordered that government employees be hired based on competitive exams and made it unlawful to fire or demote them for political reasons. By 1920, a merit-based federal bureaucracy had largely solidified.
The U.S. civil service is unusual. Most countries — such as Brazil, Nigeria and Saudi Arabia — feature what Weber called “patrimonial” states. They are also known as patronage systems. To get and keep a job, people need a personal connection to a patron, such as a political party leader. These bureaucrats must show that they’re loyal to their patron and carry out their wishes on the job. As a result, the patron’s personal whims may guide a bureaucrat’s actions more than the need to execute the job’s responsibilities. Public administration becomes infused with politics.
Trump wanted to slash the federal government. But federal agencies are doing just fine.
Patronage systems can unleash corruption
Social scientists find a variety of problems in patronage systems. Because patrimonial officials are less restrained by impersonal law, corruption can flourish. For example, before civil service reform in the United States, many bureaucrats were expected to give a 2 percent kickback of their salaries to fund their patrons’ political campaigns.
As the United States moved toward merit-based standards, corruption lessened. Researchers have found an inverse relationship between meritocracy and corruption in countries throughout the world. The association remains even after weighing other factors that might affect corruption, such as a country’s wealth and level of democracy.
Civil service protections help insulate bureaucrats from political pressures, which facilitates what we think of as good governance: less wasteful spending, better management and more efficient services such as mail delivery.
When politicians erode these merit-based standards, they risk harming essential government functions and provoking effective administrators to flee to the private sector. Over time, people may come to regard government not as something that provides public goods but that distributes personal favors — shifting elections from debates over government policies to competitions over who will distribute and receive patronage.
Biden inherited a broken government. Attracting a new generation of civil servants won’t be easy.
The upsides of merit-based bureaucracies
Because a meritocratic government operates according to clear and calculable rules, Weber believed that it enabled capitalism. Indeed, in the late 19th century, U.S. business groups pushed for civil service reform for just this reason. Scholars have linked rational-legal institutions to higher economic growth in developing countries as well.
Further, merit-based administration assists the rule of law, a cornerstone of democracy. Writing here at TMC last year, Walter Shaub argued that the federal civil service — more than Congress or executive branch investigators — helped prevent undemocratic actions when Trump behaved lawlessly.
As with any big topic, researchers continue to probe these relationships. For instance, some are exploring whether a merit-based civil service’s positive effect on economic growth may be confined to certain historical eras. Others are investigating whether economic development causes good institutions, not the other way around. Still others are working on creating better measurements to refine our knowledge.
Yet overall, we have credible explanations for why meritocratic bureaucracies have better results than politicized systems. When thinking about reorganizing the civil service, consider that the U.S. government already has about 4,000 political appointees in the federal bureaucracy. Approximately one-third of them require Senate approval. A variety of research suggests the strong downsides of adding even more partisans to those political ranks.
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Ryan Saylor is an associate professor of political science at the University of Tulsa, researching how creditors pressed for meritocratic bureaucracies in Europe historically, and author of “State Building in Boom Times: Commodities and Coalitions in Latin America and Africa” (Oxford University Press, 2014).