Professor “Scott Radnitz”:http://faculty.washington.edu/srad/ sends along the following comments on last week’s events in Kyrgyzstan. (As an aside, for comparativists out there: please note how for this particular crisis/event, The Monkey Cage has turned into a forum for multiple regional specialists to have their views heard (see “here”:https://themonkeycage.org/2010/04/kyrgyzstan_as_a_rotten_door_tr.html, “here”:https://themonkeycage.org/2010/04/more_expert_commentary_on_kyrg.html, and “here”:https://themonkeycage.org/2010/04/kyrgyzstan_as_a_delayed_colore_1.html.) We would love for The Monkey Cage to continue to serve this role in the future.) From Professor Radnitz:
bq. I think one of the more under-appreciated aspects of the recent (and ongoing) events is how close the country came to civil war. As I write this, Bakiev is holed up in his home village outside Jalalabad, surrounded by supporters, and he still refuses to resign. But the most dangerous moment has passed. After the collapse of his government, when word got out that Bakiev had landed in Kazakhstan but then returned to southern Kyrgyzstan, a twitter rumor circulated saying that 50,000 Bakiev supporters in the south had gathered and were distributing weapons. This rumor was picked up by some Russian-language press outlets. We now know that it was inaccurate.
bq. Now, that number is obviously ridiculously high (the whole country has a little over five million people), but the possibility of Bakiev amassing armed supporters in the south was plausible and might have been only narrowly averted. Here is the counterfactual scenario I see:
bq. Bakiev flies to Osh or Jalalabad, works with his governors, mayors, and other elite supporters to mobilize people for his cause, which, as I’ve argued elsewhere, is not hard to do in Kyrgyzstan. These people then occupy the central squares of the regional capitals, guard the regional and local administration buildings, and acquire weapons from allies in the police or any of a number of “violent entrepreneurs,” who might also provide “muscle” from their thuggish sport clubs.
bq. If this had occurred, by the time supporters of the opposition-turned-interim government got their supporters out in force, there would have been standoffs–probably armed–between two hostile camps and a situation of dual power in the country. Low-level skirmishes would be interpreted as “north-south conflict,” which would ricochet to the north in the form of retaliatory attacks against southern migrants. This would resemble how the Tajik Civil War began in 1992, but in reverse–from the regions to the capital.
bq. Now, I’m no alarmist. I often criticize the premises of alarmist International Crisis Group reports and in general think the north-south division in Kyrgyzstan is taken too literally. However, under slightly different circumstances, regional identity could have suddenly become salient and people might have begun to act in self-defense based on that identity according to a security dilemma logic. The result would be very messy. So why didn’t this scenario come to pass? Two reasons spring to mind:
bq. First, Bakiev didn’t/doesn’t have that many supporters in the south willing to put their lives on the line for him. Even though northerners perceived Bakiev as representing “southern” interests, in fact southerners suffered just as much as northerners during his 5-year rule. Bakiev worked in the interests of his immediate family, not his “tribe” and certainly not the whole south.
bq. Second, Bakiev is not a megalomaniac and was not willing to push the country to the brink. While initial reports seemed to indicate he saw himself as a martyr, it soon became clear that he returned to Kyrgyzstan not to hold on to power at all costs, but to negotiate for a better deal for himself and his family. This appears to be where we are now. Bakiev and his (relatively few and very local) supporters maintain leverage over the interim government by refusing to formally give up, thus delaying its consolidation and preventing full international recognition. In return, Bakiev hopes to secure immunity and safe passage out of the country for as many family members as possible.
bq. Thus, we can now (knock on wood) comfortably debate whether these events are or are not comparable to the “color revolutions” rather than discuss the origins of the 2010 Kyrgyz Civil War. Let’s hope it stays that way.
After having read Scott’s remarks, I asked him about this morning’s “NY Times article”:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/13/world/asia/13kyrgyz.html?ref=todayspaper discussing plans for the arrest of Bakiev with the ominous headline _Fugitive Kyrgyz President Warns of Bloodshed_. Scott’s response:
bq. I saw the report about the arrest warrant too. Maybe they’re calling Bakiev’s bluff, or maybe it’s also a bluff. Both sides have an incentive to shape the perception that they have the upper hand, right? It will help them in bargaining.