In a New York Times op-ed this week, the Greek finance minister Yanis Varoufakis informed the world that he is not a game theorist. As Henry Farrell observes, however, that’s just what an exceptionally clever game theorist might say.
Yet Varoufakis insists that Greece’s opposition to austerity is more than a negotiating tactic. He claims to reject that “there are no circumstances when we must do what is right not as a strategy but simply because it is … right.” Varoufakis credits his inspiration to a surprising source: “The major influence here is Immanuel Kant, the German philosopher who taught us that the rational and the free escape the empire of expediency by doing what is right.”
What is Varoufakis saying? He seems to be referring to Kant’s argument that moral actions must be compatible with principles valid for all rational beings. In the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, Kant formulates this “categorical imperative” as follows: “act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.”
Kant’s idea is not as odd as it sounds. He means that in determining whether an action is moral, we should first consider the general principle behind it. Consider taking something that doesn’t belong to you. For Kant, the “maxim” of this action is “theft is allowed.”
It might seem that theft should be allowed, at least under extreme circumstances. But Kant asks you to take the further step of imagining a world in everyone acts on the basis of the maxim in question.
Yet such a world makes no sense in this case. The concept of theft presumes some right of property. If everyone were allowed to steal, property would be meaningless. The maxim “theft is allowed” thus contradicts itself when it is made universal.
According to Kant, the discovery that given maxim cannot be universalized implies that we have a “perfect duty” never to act on it. For example, we must never steal — however tempting it may be. This conclusion gives Kant his reputation for heartlessness. He is literally arguing that it is moral to go hungry rather than to take a loaf of bread.
So perhaps Varoufakis is saying that Greece is obligated to reject an unjust deal with its creditors — even if the Greek economy collapses as a result. As many commenters have pointed out, that would be deeply irresponsible.
On other hand, the argument about choosing right over interest could easily be turned around. Germany benefits from a weak euro, which make its goods cheap but make also it impossible for the likes of Greece or Italy to compete through further devaluation. That arrangement clearly fails the test of universalization. It’s Germany, then, that’s failing to live up to Kantian standards. Varoufakis may be highlighting this irony by appealing to a hero of German culture against German policy.
Varoufakis might also have a different part of Kant’s philosophy in mind. In the essay “Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch,” Kant argues that an immoral world isn’t just the object of imagination. We actually observe it, to some extent in our daily lives, but especially in international affairs. Although no one does his duty all the time, individuals demonstrate astonishing moral courage. States, on the other hand, typically act in ways that seem to be based on immoral maxims.
Kant argues, however, that careful reflection on the international scene demonstrates the immorality does not pay. States gain temporary advantages from lying to or cheating the competitors. But since those competitors turn around and do the same thing, no one gets ahead for long.
Kant contends that the only solution is for states to set general rules under which each state renounces injustice toward others in exchange for a guarantee of the same treatment. According to Kant, this will lead ultimately to a league of republics that renounce the use of war against each other.
This vision of a republican federation is often derided as utopian. But for Kant, it’s very much opposite because it is based on appeals to interest rather than morality. Kant does not think that states will simply embrace the categorical imperative. Rather, he hopes the pursuit of their interests — particularly their interest in peace — will lead them to treat each in a manner compatible with morality.
Kant might be right. For all the E.U.’s failures as a monetary unit, it is hard to imagine a scenario in which its members fought each other. And as Kant predicted, that’s not because they’ve become communities of saints. Rather, it’s because they learned from bitter experience that military competition led only to mutual destruction.
The question that hangs over Greece is whether the same is true when it comes to economic relations. According to Kant’s logic, a Germany should recognize that beggar-thy-neighbors policies are not only unjust but also self-defeating, and help put Greece on the path to sustainable growth. A Kantian Europe would be based on the cooperative pursuit of enlightened self-interest, not national martyrdom.