Nimmi Gowrinathan, a Phd Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles (ngowrinathan@opusa.org) offers us the following election analysis from war torn Sri Lanka.
On April 8, Sri Lanka held its first nation-wide parliamentary election following the Government of Sri Lanka’s brutal military defeat of the separatist Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), ending nearly three decades of political violence on the island. Drawing on the political capital created by this victory, the UPFA party of recently re-elected President Mahinda Rajapaksa won a clear majority just short of the 2/3 needed to make significant constitutional changes (first on the president’s agenda: eliminating term limits)–signaling a more permanent shift in the nation’s political culture away from institutions designed to foster a multi-cultural democracy towards a top-heavy model, more akin to a ‘benevolent dictatorship’. (Interview with Director of the Center for Policy Alternatives).
In a nation where devolution of power (if not complete autonomy) has remained at the center of the island’s ethnic conflict between the majority Sinhalese and minority Tamil communities, the consolidation of power at the center (reinforced and protected by an increasingly militarized state) further diminishes hopes for reconciliation within a unitary state structure. While the voter turnout in the recent elections was low island-wide (55% of 14 million registered voters), in the conflict-affected predominantly Tamil districts turnout was dismally so – ranging from only 17-25%.
These numbers reflect a broader crisis of political representation for the minority Tamil community on the island. In the post-LTTE era, recently displaced communities in the North East feel there is no Tamil leadership or organization on the island whom they can trust to advocate for their welfare and political rights (Anonymous Interview with Government Agent). Lingering “state-of-emergency” measures have effectively shut down Tamil civil society—leaving relief and rehabilitation programs to be contracted out to large INGOs. The remnants of Tamil political parties are internally fractured and marginalized—forced to put forth watered down political platforms to ensure their survival. Activists in Colombo fear that at best these processes allow Tamil civilians a “consultative” role, with little hope for a truly “inclusive” approach to addressing the ongoing humanitarian and political crisis.
Within this new political reality, where use of the term “minority” itself is a subversive act, has the space for the articulation of Tamil political aspirations on the island narrowed to the point of irrelevance, if not completely closed? This is the central argument of those within the very active global Tamil diaspora of roughly one million who have spent the past year re-thinking their engagement with politics on the island, and forming the (Provisional) Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (homeland).
Over the course of the past thirty years, the Tamil diaspora has largely been viewed as the finance arm of the LTTE . While this oversimplification overlooks the multiple forms of activism within the diaspora, the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009 did initiate new discussions amongst a broad segment of the diaspora community, all of whom were profoundly disappointed with the inaction of the International Community. It was determined that in the absence of a “popular democratic Tamil organization”, the needs of the Tamil people lacked credibility in the eyes of the International Community. (Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam Advisory Report).
Drawing upon examples of diaspora engagement in Italy, Eritrea, Israel, and Croatia, the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam is conceived as an independent, nonviolent, political project that will not transgress the laws of any host country. The TGTE strives to create a democratically elected body amongst “Eelam Tamils” (Tamils born in, or related to those born in Sri Lanka) whose stated goals are the “protection of the security of the people in the Tamil homeland and the full and early realization of the right to self-determination – democratically endorsed by Tamils within Sri Lanka in the 1977 Parliamentary elections” (Provisional Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam Advisory Report).
On May 2nd 2010, 26 countries will participate in a general election to elect 135 members from the Tamil diaspora to the Transnational Constituent Assembly. Funds for this election were raised privately by working groups within each participating country, where voters will have the option of visiting an established polling location, or voting online. Canada, having the largest percentage of diaspora Tamils, will have the largest quota of 25 members, and the diaspora in the United States will elect 10 representatives. At this stage, organizers optimistically expect participation levels as high as 60-70% globally. (Interview with V. Rudrakumaran)
While the project is still in its formative stages, its initial attempt to re-define the grievances of Sri Lankan Tamils within a more credible framework has produced some encouraging results. The TGTE is based on a foundational commitment to transparency, democracy, and human rights; encourages and actively seeks out the participation of women as candidates and key decision makers; and aims to form a collective identity which transcends class and religion—in particular bridging the gap with the Muslim Tamil population both on the island and abroad.
The newly formed Constituent Assembly will be immediately tasked with addressing some of the central tensions inherent in this new political project. First will be the assumptions of the strong link between TGTE and the LTTE that continue to plague the organization. While the founders of the TGTE have made clear their intention that this project be an independent, nonviolent phase for the Tamil movement, symbolic ties to the militant group remain, both as a sign of respect and to maintain support amongst the broader Tamil diaspora. It remains to be seen whether the TGTE’s attempt to de-link the LTTE’s goal of an separate homeland from the methods used to achieve that goal will be palatable to the International Community.
Second, even those diplomats and academics sympathetic to the project itself, question the language of “government” versus a the less threatening terminology of a social movement, or a diaspora collective. Advisory Chairman, Visuvanathan Rudrakumaran responds that the TGTE will engage in political, humanitarian, and social matters impacting Tamils in Sri Lanka, activities more akin to a government than a social movement that might be more limited in its scope. (Interview with Rudrakumaran)
Finally, and perhaps most significantly for the study of transnational politics, are the larger questions of legitimacy and representation. Civil society leaders in Colombo point to the large disconnect between continually shifting ground realities and the perceptions and activities of those in the diaspora. They welcome the funding and input of the diaspora in humanitarian relief (which the diaspora has historically played a large role in)– but feel that any political solution for the Tamil minority must be determined within the island itself. Though the diaspora maintains strong ties to communities in the North East through family members and school associations, most have not felt safe to return to these areas since their initial departure. They believe that the persecution they faced on the island has forced the Tamil nation as a whole to be spread out across the globe, justifying their continued involvement in
the ongoing political struggle.
At best, the TGTE could be an effective advocacy tool pushing concerned nations to exert pressure on the Government of Sri Lanka to address the legitimate grievances of the Tamil population on the island. At worst, it creates a platform for hardliners within the diaspora – feeding into government claims and international concern of a resurgence of Tamil militancy on the island. The success of the project over time can (and should) only be measured in its ability to ensure a permanent political solution for the Tamil minority in Sri Lanka.
Nimmi Gowrinathan is a Phd Candidate in the Department of Political Science at the University of California, Los Angeles. ngowrinathan@opusa.org