On Jan. 28, China released its first white paper on space-related activities in five years. China is an increasingly important space power and a potential challenger to U.S. interests. This new document provides insights into China’s space ambitions and priorities — both in what is stated explicitly and in what is missing.
The document underscores China’s larger ambition to shape international rules governing outer space and offers insights on Beijing’s plans to overcome significant obstacles facing its commercial space sector. And the paper suggests Beijing may be in no hurry to formally commit to crewed lunar missions.
China plans to shape the rules governing outer space
Notably, this document devotes an entire section to the global governance of space. Compared with China’s last space white paper, the current paper articulates a more active role for Beijing in shaping international rules governing outer space.
Some governments might see this as a positive development — an indication that China may prioritize international cooperation in outer space, as well as space sustainability (the ability for humans to access and use space for various purposes). Current legal interpretations allow countries to conduct anti-satellite tests. For example, the 1967 Outer Space Treaty only bans placing weapons of mass destruction in outer space and military activities on celestial bodies — but does not ban space weapons (including testing them).
Russia proved it can shoot down a satellite. Does this make space less secure?
Given the world’s increasing reliance on satellites, space debris poses a growing challenge with profound consequences for the global economy, international security and everyday life. But objects in orbit are threatened by space debris ranging in size from a paint flake to large, defunct satellites — and this debris travels at roughly 10 times the speed of a bullet. Growing “clouds” of debris can cascade, threatening to make space inaccessible to human activity.
Yet there are reasons to be cautious about Chinese attempts at space governance. In 2014, China and Russia proposed the Prevention of the Placement of Weapons in Outer Space Treaty. Critics emphasize that this treaty lacks mechanisms for verifying compliance and allows China and Russia to continue developing ground-based anti-satellite weapons. U.S. officials highlighted the hypocrisy of China and Russia proposing arms control measures for space while aggressively developing counterspace weapons. The United States has also shot down satellites (though producing far less debris than China’s 2007 test), notably during Operation Burnt Frost in 2008.
Would China be interested in some modest governance measures in space? The new white paper points out that China views space capabilities as essential for economic development and building a “digital China,” which would inherently rely on satellites for communication and transportation. China today has far more to lose from outer space becoming littered with space debris than it did in the past — a trend that will likely increase as China continues investing in space capabilities.
Consequently, there may be some areas in space governance where Chinese and U.S. interests are becoming more aligned. In January, a senior U.S. official suggested that the United States may be interested in rules to ban debris-creating anti-satellite tests. Nonetheless, China’s interest in making international rules for outer space may not necessarily align with U.S. interests. Instead, some of these rules may be aimed at binding U.S activities while allowing China to reap the soft power benefits of “acting responsibly.”
Companies are commercializing outer space. Do government programs still matter?
What did we learn about China’s commercial space sector?
In 2014, China announced that it would allow private investment into its space sector, leading to more than 100 new Chinese space companies. Some analysts worry that this will give China an edge against the U.S. commercial sector, claiming that the United States is “losing the second space race” to China.
However, there is no data to suggest that China’s commercial space sector is even close to rivaling the multibillion-dollar U.S. commercial space sector, other than the number of rocket launches — a count that measures mostly government-funded activity. China’s commercial space sector also faces serious challenges, including the absence of a domestic national space law, the continued dominance of state-owned enterprises in the economy and limited access to military-run launch sites. Consequently, Chinese analysts are far less bullish about the prospects of China’s commercial space sector than outside observers.
This latest white paper suggests that Beijing seeks to solve at least some of the challenges confronting China’s commercial space sector. China will try to “optimize the distribution of the space industry in the national industrial chain,” the document notes, regulate the licensing of civil space launches and “speed up the formulation of a national space law.” The paper also notes that China has already developed plans to build more commercial launch sites over the next five years.
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What about China’s moon plans?
Top Chinese space officials have suggested that China plans to send humans to the moon. Yet China’s white paper does not offer concrete plans for such missions or an explicit commitment to carry them out. It states the objective to “continue studies and research on the plan for a human lunar landing, develop new-generation manned spacecraft.” The absence of any concrete proposals suggests that Chinese leaders may have concerns about investing in such an expensive endeavor or about China’s ability to accomplish such a goal.
Sending humans to the moon could provide China with prestige benefits, both internationally and domestically. China has used its human spaceflight program for domestic propaganda, and there are high levels of Chinese public support for sending humans to the moon. However, such missions would be expensive. And China faces slowing economic growth and has already committed to building a space station.
Overall, China’s newest space white paper provides important clues about Beijing’s space ambitions in the next five years. Yet the document is (unsurprisingly) silent on China’s military space plans and, as a result, isn’t likely to assuage growing concerns in the United States and elsewhere about China’s military space ambitions. As other scholars have argued, even capabilities used to mitigate space debris have dual-use functions and may be perceived as space weapons.
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R. Lincoln Hines (@lincolnhines) is an assistant professor for the West Space Seminar at the U.S. Air War College. His research focuses on the role of domestic politics, nationalism and prestige in Chinese security and space ambitions. The views expressed or implied are those of the author alone and do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Department of Defense, or of any organization the author is affiliated with including Air University, the U.S. Air Force, the U.S. Space Force, or any other U.S. government agency.