As the 2010 Ukrainian presidential elections draw to a close, much of the narrative in the mass media has focused on the implications of the elections for the fate of the Orange Revolution (although an interesting secondary narrative concerns what the “election means for Russia”:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/europe/09ukraine.html?hp). Two stories predominate. The first, as typified by the headline “Ukraine Vote Kills Orange Revolution”:http://www.thestar.com/news/world/article/762493–ukraine-vote-kills-orange-revolution, is that the victory in 2010 of 2005 loser Victor Yanukovych represents a stunning rebuke to the Orange Revolution. The other story is that the very fact that Yanukovych was able to win such a closely fought contest shows that the Orange Revolution has “actually succeeded”:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/europe/09ukraine.html?hp in its real underlying goal of bringing real electoral democracy to Ukraine.
With this as a background, we “welcome back”:https://themonkeycage.org/2010/01/2010_ukrainian_presidential_election_round_1.html “Lucan Way”:http://www.utoronto.ca/jacyk/Lucan%20way%20Profile.htm to provide guest commentary on the second round of the Ukrainian presidential elections:
*The Ukrainian Election: Tymoshenko’s Strong Showing*
At first glance, the victory of Victor Yanukovych in the second round of the Ukrainian Presidential election on Sunday marked “a stunning rebuke of Yulia Tymoshenko and a remarkable comeback for the much vilified Yanukovych”:http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/09/world/europe/09ukraine.html?hp whose efforts to steal the Presidential election in 2004 sparked the Orange Revolution. Yet a closer examination of the results suggests while Tymoshenko failed to mobilize as much support as Yushchenko did in 2004, she did remarkably well for an incumbent given the state of the economy.
In one sense, this election was a remarkable victory for Yanukovych, who gained 49 percent of the vote — 4 points more than in 2004. Yanukovych attracted 25 and 50 percent more votes in central and western Ukraine – the base of support for the orange revolution – than he did in 2004. At the same time, Tymoshenko mobilized just 72% and 79% of the support Yushchenko had attracted in central and Western Ukraine in 2004. Her failure to mobilize this support cost her the election. Had she mobilized 10% more in either Central or Western Ukraine, she would have won the election.
Above all, this election was marked by remarkable cynicism and apathy on both sides. One Ukrainian commentary compared the election to a “choice between “rape and robbery”:http://www.pravda.com.ua/rus/articles/4b5d6bad405bf/”. Combined, Yanukovych and Tymoshenko obtained just over half of all votes in the first round last month– as compared to 80 percent that supported Yushchenko and Yanukovych in the first round in 2004. In the second round this year, turnout – 69 percent – was lower than in the final rounds of Presidential elections in 2004 (77 percent) and 1999 (75 percent). Finally, a larger share of voters (4.4 percent) voted “against all candidates” than in any Presidential election since Ukrainian independence. Support for “against all” was about equal in Yanukovych’s eastern Ukraine (4.2 percent) as in Tymoshenko’s western Ukraine (3.6 percent). In fact, Yanukovych, like Tymoshenko, had trouble mobilizing his base. Thus, he garnered just 86 percent of the votes in he had collected in Eastern Ukraine in 2004 when he lost.
At the same time, Tymoshenko did far better than any incumbent could reasonably expect given the fact that the Ukrainian economy shrank by 15 percent in 2009 (the largest single year decline since 1994). With declining government revenues, Ukraine currently faces “imminent bankruptcy”:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703569004575008990183229012.html. In the face of such a record, Tymoshenko garnered 46 percent of the vote and came 715,000 votes (3 percent) shy of a victory. Few expected her to do so well.
The primary reason for Tymoshenko’s surprisingly strong performance is the persistence of a strong regional divide between a “pro European” western and a “pro Russian” eastern Ukraine. While there are today “few substantively important policy differences between the two sides”:https://themonkeycage.org/2010/01/2010_ukrainian_presidential_election_ro , the country continues to witness some of the most severe electoral polarization in the world. Thus, despite some inroads made by Yanukovych into Western Ukraine, Tymoshenko still captured an overwhelming 79 percent of the vote there – compared to 18 percent in the East. Such regional polarization virtually guarantees that no matter the circumstances, elections in Ukraine will continue to be highly competitive for the foreseeable future.